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Article

Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth
Amendment
L. Song Richardson†
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholars have demonstrated that judges often construct legal theories based upon inaccurate assumptions
about human behavior.1 Often, the behavioral assumptions
embedded in legal doctrine are unstated. In fact, because “these
assumptions seem self-evidently correct, even when they are
wrong . . . judges sometimes incorporate empirically testable
social science claims into their legal reasoning without even noticing that they are doing so.”2
Behavioral realist scholars argue that judges should not
base their theories of human behavior on a purely conceptual, a
priori process, but rather on the best empirical scientific evi† Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., Harvard College. The author is indebted to Al Alschuler, Adam
Benforado, John Bronsteen, Dorothy Brown, Jack Chin, Angela Davis, Mary
Fan, James Forman, Lorie Fridell, Andrew Gold, Michele Goodwin, Aya Gruber, Angela Harris, Cynthia Ho, Tonja Jacobi, Cynthia Lee, Wayne Logan, Eric Miller, Wadie Said, Nirej Sekhon, Terry Smith, Andrew Taslitz, Deborah
Tuerkheimer, and faculty members who attended workshops at Northwestern
University Law School, Washington University in St. Louis Law School, University of Akron Law School, and St. Louis University School of Law for helpful comments and discussions of earlier drafts. I am grateful for the excellent
research assistance provided by Andrea Martinez and Myra Lieb. In addition,
I am appreciative of the excellent work performed by Jordan Shepherd, Daniel
Block, and the Minnesota Law Review on this Article. All errors are my own.
Copyright © 2011 by L. Song Richardson.
1. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2006). For related work exploring the effects of situational factors on behavior, see, for example, Adam Benforado,
Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333 (2010) and Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).
2. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1002.
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dence that exists.3 These scholars primarily utilize the science
of implicit social cognition to test the embedded behavioral assumptions about human decisionmaking and judgments contained within legal doctrine.4 This science combines the lessons
of social psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience5 to examine mental processes that occur outside of
conscious awareness and that operate without conscious control.6 Employing this science, these scholars critique legal doctrine and challenge courts to take accurate theories of human
behavior into account or to explain their failure to do so.7
Largely absent from the behavioral realist conversation
thus far are Fourth Amendment scholars.8 The void is surprising because at the core of the Fourth Amendment rests concerns about police-citizen interactions. The science of implicit
social cognition (the science) can contribute much to the understanding of police behavior, especially as it relates to the
treatment of nonwhites.
3. Id. at 1001.
4. See generally Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
945 (2006).
5. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cognition and the Law 2 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458678; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations,
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 144 (2004) (describing the evolution of social cognition). For a comprehensive history of the science of implicit bias and critiques,
see John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable
Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 42–46 (2009).
6. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral
Realist Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1064 –65; Kang
& Lane, supra note 5, at 14 –16; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1489, 1571–72 (2005); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1.
8. But see Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles
to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7 (2010). Other criminal procedure scholars
have highlighted the need to pay more attention to social science. See, e.g.,
Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) (“The most current and reliable empirical and
social scientific evidence must inform the normative judgments at the heart of
constitutional criminal procedure.”); see also David A. Harris, What Criminal
Law and Procedure Can Learn from Criminology Symposium, 7 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2009); Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 31, 33 (2009).
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Consider hit rates or “arrest efficiency”9 as an example. Hit
rates are the rates at which the police find contraband or other
evidence of criminal activity when they conduct a stop and
search.10 Hit-rate data, when available,11 consistently demonstrate that stops and searches of whites are more successful in
yielding evidence of criminal activity than stops of blacks, or
that the rates are at least equal. In Minnesota, for example, the
hit rates for finding contraband are 11.17 percent for blacks
and 23.53 percent for whites.12 In Los Angeles, frisked blacks
are forty-two percent less likely than whites to be found with
weapons, twenty-five percent less likely to be found with drugs,
and thirty-three percent less likely to be found with other contraband.13 Similar results have been obtained in New York,14
9. This phrase is borrowed from Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of
the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context
of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007).
10. Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2004).
11. Most jurisdictions do not gather data on police stops, searches, and
frisks, and thus do not have the data necessary to calculate hit rates. R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection
Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1102 (2001); David Rudovsky,
Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops
and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 304 –06 (2001). In fact,
law enforcement agencies frequently and vociferously object to data collection
efforts. Rudovsky, supra, at 305.
12. UNIV. OF MINN. INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE
RACIAL PROFILING REPORT 36 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/irp/
racialprof/aggregate%20report%2092303.pdf.
13. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE
OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 8 (2008), available at
http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.
14. Statistics gathered by the New York Police Department for the first
nine months of 2009 demonstrate that eighty-four percent of pedestrians
stopped were either black or Hispanic. Bob Herbert, Jim Crow Policing, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A26, available at 2010 WLNR 2156316. Yet, only 1.6
percent of the blacks and 1.5 percent of the Hispanics stopped were found in
possession of contraband. Police stopped whites far less (about sixteen percent
of the time), but found contraband 2.2 percent of the time. Id. In 2006, the hit
rate for white suspects was 6.4 percent compared to 5.7 percent for black suspects. Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke Pot, but Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2009, at A24, available at 2009 WLNR 25781059 (noting that in 2008,
blacks were seven times more likely and Latinos four times more likely than
whites to be arrested for marijuana possession, even though whites were the
heaviest users of marijuana); see also Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as
Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 591, 604 –24 (2010) (analyzing data on marijuana
arrests in New York City and finding unwarranted disparities).
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Illinois,15 Rhode Island,16 Missouri,17 and West Virginia.18 Yet,
the police consistently stop and search blacks at higher rates
than whites.19
I do not dispute the fact that conscious racial bias against
blacks can explain why the police continue to disproportionately stop and search blacks despite the hit-rate data.20 However,
15. ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS
STATISTICS STUDY 12–13 (2008), available at http://www.dot.state.il.us/
travelstats/ITSS%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf (“[P]olice are 1.6 times
more likely to find contraband in the vehicle driven by a Caucasian driver.”).
16. “African Americans and Latinos were much more likely to be stopped
by police and much more likely to be searched once stopped, even though
Whites were more likely to be found with contraband.” ACLU, THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC PROFILING IN THE UNITED STATES 62
(2009) (citing AMY FARRELL & JACK MCDEVITT, RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP
STATISTICS DATA COLLECTION STUDY 2004 –2005, at 79 (2006)), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf.
17. A 2007 report found that blacks were sixty-six percent more likely
than whites to be stopped, and 1.79 times more likely to be searched than
whites. The hit rates for contraband were twenty-three percent for whites and
17.6 percent for blacks. Executive Summary on 2007 Missouri Vehicle Stops,
MO. ATT’Y GEN., http://ago.mo.gov/racialprofiling/2007/racialprofiling2007.htm
(last visited May 6, 2011).
18. Blacks and Latinos are 1.5 times more likely to be stopped than
whites, and 2.5 times more likely to have their vehicles searched despite the
fact that minority drivers are less likely to have contraband. West Virginia
Traffic Stop Study: 2009 Final Report, W. VA. DIVISION JUST. & COMMUNITY
SERVICES, http://www.djcs.wv.gov/SAC/Pages/WVTrafficStopStudy.aspx (last
visited May 6, 2011).
19. In New York, for example, blacks were stopped twenty-three percent
more often than whites and this proportion of stops was not explained by previous arrest rates. Gelman et al., supra note 9, at 817. In Los Angeles, blacks
were more than twice as likely as whites to be stopped. AYRES & BOROWSKY,
supra note 13, at 5; see also Rudovsky, supra note 11, at 340–42 (describing a
study of stops and frisks on the streets of Pennsylvania showing disproportionate stops of black pedestrians, especially in white-dominated areas). Moreover,
there is reason to believe that hit rates, where available, may actually underrepresent the number of innocent blacks who are stopped because officers may
fail to accurately report the number of innocents they encounter. See, e.g., Rudovsky, supra note 11, at 312 (giving the example of police officers falsifying
records of the race of those stopped and searched).
20. Economists and civil liberties scholars both provide this explanation
when the hit rate is lower for blacks than for whites. See Harcourt, supra note
10, at 1276–78 nn.2–14. Professor Harcourt argues that economic models are
flawed because their definition of “success” relates to maximizing the rates of
successful searches. He argues that “[t]he proper goal for the police is to minimize the social cost of crime.” Id. at 1295; see also Donna Coker, Addressing
the Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 836–39 (2003) (describing a study showing that while
officers sought search warrants for drugs more often for blacks, the success
rates for finding drugs was higher for whites).
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the operation of implicit biases can create similar results. The
science of implicit social cognition demonstrates that individuals of all races have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes
and prejudices that can negatively and nonconsciously affect
behavior towards blacks.21 The implicit stereotype consists of
the cultural stereotype of blacks, especially young men, as violent, hostile, aggressive, and dangerous.22 In the policing context, implicit stereotypes can cause an officer who harbors no
conscious racial animosity and who rejects using race as a
proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat individuals differently based solely upon their physical appearance.
As a result of implicit biases, an officer might evaluate behaviors engaged in by individuals who appear black
as suspicious even as identical behavior by those who appear
white would go unnoticed. In other words, even when officers
are not intentionally engaged in conscious racial profiling, implicit biases can lead to a lower threshold for finding identical
behavior suspicious when engaged in by blacks than by
whites.23
Conscious racial profiling likely multiplies the effects of
implicit bias on police behavior. Assume for a moment that of21. See, e.g., Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious
Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483,
500 (2004) (finding that both black and white probation and police officers
have implicit biases against black juveniles); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945,
949–52 (2006); Kang, supra note 7, at 1499–506; Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 439–44 (2007);
Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 20 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1195, 1197–201 (2009). For a fascinating discussion on the myriad of
ways to conceptualize racial bias and the absence of definitional consensus,
see R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially
Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1182–89 (2006).
22. See Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002) [hereinafter Correll, Dilemma]; Patricia G.
Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1139, 1146–49
(1995); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 32–36 (1986);
Joachim Krueger, Personal Beliefs and Cultural Stereotypes About Racial
Characteristics, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 536, 545–47 (1996).
23. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of
Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976); infra Part II.
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ficers engaged in profiling will only approach and question
those blacks whose behavior they deem suspicious. The problem is that focusing attention on blacks with the assumption
that they are more likely to be engaged in criminal activity activates implicit biases. These biases then influence how officers
interpret the ambiguous behaviors they observe. Consequently,
whether or not officers are engaged in conscious racial profiling, they may stop more blacks than whites, but they will be
more accurate when they stop whites because more unambiguous evidence of criminal activity is necessary before they will
evaluate the behavior as suspicious.
This Article argues that the behavioral-realist approach is
important to the study of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and policing. The Amendment is primarily concerned with protecting individual privacy against arbitrary government intrusion.24 In their efforts to protect privacy, judges often make assumptions related to police decisionmaking, judgments, and
perceptions. To the extent that courts construct Fourth
Amendment doctrine based upon behaviorally unrealistic assumptions about an officer’s abilities in these areas, the resulting doctrine will not adequately protect privacy.
This Article demonstrates the efficacy of behavioral realism in the Fourth Amendment context by utilizing its framework to scrutinize the Court’s stop-and-frisk jurisprudence. My
primary focus is on pedestrian stops rather than traffic stops.
Traffic stops and the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v.
United States25 will be the subject of a future article.
The Court’s stop-and-frisk doctrine allows invasions upon
individual privacy when police officers judge that an individual’s actions are reasonably suspicious. The Court’s assumptions
about an officer’s ability to make these judgments do not withstand empirical scrutiny when tested against the science. The
failure to be behaviorally realistic leads to policing that inadequately protects privacy while simultaneously failing to further
effective law enforcement.
This Article argues that if the Fourth Amendment is to
realize its normative commitment to obtain the appropriate
balance between privacy and security, courts should reconsider
their behavioral assumptions about police decisionmaking and
judgments of criminality. Otherwise, the privacy protections of24. See infra Part II.
25. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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fered by the Fourth Amendment will be a scarce commodity for
those communities most affected by the operation of implicit
biases on the police. This Article offers specific suggestions for
“[r]eckon[ing] with”26 implicit bias in policing and the Fourth
Amendment.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the
science of implicit bias, including a discussion of how implicit
biases can affect police-citizen interactions.27 Since blacks have
been the focus of implicit social cognition research, this Article
focuses on them. Part II applies the behavioral realist framework to the Fourth Amendment’s stop-and-frisk doctrine, revealing the doctrine’s perverse effects on privacy and policing.
It ends with some tentative proposals for doctrinal reform. Part
III suggests structural changes within police departments to
ameliorate the effects of implicit bias on police behavior. This
Article concludes that the behavioral realist approach is important to the study of the Fourth Amendment and urges criminal
procedure scholars to utilize its methods.

26. This phrase is borrowed from Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987). In his groundbreaking article, Professor Lawrence introduced
the science of unconscious racism based upon psychoanalytic theory and discussed its application to the law. As the title of his article suggests, he urged
scholars and judges to “[r]eckon[ ] with unconscious racism.” Id. In contrast,
this Article does not address Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Rather, it focuses
on the new science of implicit social cognition. This Article joins many prior
scholars who have used this science to explore contemporary racial bias. See,
e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role
of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV.
1893, 1908–11 (2009); Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1064; Kang, supra note
7; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1; Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 471, 536–49 (2008); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345,
354 (2007); Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The
Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190–
98 (2010); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62
VAND. L. REV. 55, 74 –77 (2009); Symposium on Behavioral Realism, supra
note 4. For a recent critique of unconscious bias, see Ralph Richard Banks &
Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law, Politics,
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009).
27. See, e.g., Jamie L. Flexon et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in
the Police Among Chicago Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180, 182 (2009) (noting
the “paucity of research on Latinos’ responses to police contacts”).
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I. OVERVIEW OF IMPLICIT BIASES
Research in the field of implicit social cognition repeatedly
demonstrates that individuals of all races have nonconscious or
implicit biases that have behavioral consequences. This Part
provides an overview of the science, with an emphasis on those
behavioral consequences of relevance to police interactions with
citizens.
A. RACIAL CATEGORIZATION
Human beings categorize people and objects “in order to
make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to
deal successfully with each one on an individual basis; we must
categorize in order to cope.”28 Racial categorization, similar to
the general categorization process, is largely automatic;29 in
other words, it occurs unintentionally and without conscious
awareness.30
Racial categorization activates31 stereotypes and attitudes.32 Psychologists distinguish between stereotypes, which

28. Lawrence III, supra note 26, at 337.
29. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 17–18 (1999); Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based
to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4, 23–
24 (1990) (describing studies which demonstrate that categorization occurs
immediately). For a summary of automaticity, including methods for testing it,
see Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242 (2002).
30. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 266. Many processes contain both automatic
and controlled features. Id. at 267; see also Frederica R. Conrey et al., Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implicit Task Performance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 470 (2005) (arguing that most tasks involve both automatic and controlled processes);
Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND
DISCRIMINATION 61, 76–77 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (describing how increased control by gathering additional information or correction by overcoming bias can lead to reduced automatic stereotypical activation).
31. Activation refers to “the extent to which a stereotype is on one’s
mind.” Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 12, 14 (1999).
32. Professor Jerry Kang coined the phrase “racial mechanics” to describe
the process of racial categorization and the ascription of racial meanings to
individuals. Kang, supra note 7, at 1497. For a discussion of the categorization
process and its relationship to race, see David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W.
Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 40–42 (Robert
S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994).
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are beliefs about a social group,33 and attitudes, which are feelings or evaluations about a social group.34 Stereotypes and attitudes can be both explicit (conscious) and implicit (nonconscious). While the processes are distinct, each process contains
some elements of the other.35
The science reveals that individuals have implicit beliefs
and attitudes about racial groups that might conflict with their
explicit or consciously held thoughts and feelings.36 Once activated, implicit stereotypes and attitudes can negatively influence individuals’ judgments and behaviors towards racial minorities in ways that they are unaware of and largely unable to
control.37 Studies related to these implicit biases are discussed
in the next section. Later, in Part III, this Article will consider
the circumstances under which individuals can control and correct for the operation of implicit biases.
B. BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
This section discusses three ways in which implicit biases,
specifically the operation of implicit stereotypes, can affect behaviors.38 First, implicit biases can result in increased scrutiny
33. Stereotypes are “mental association[s] between a social group or category and a trait. The association may reflect a statistical reality, but it need
not.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 949; see also KUNDA, supra note
29, at 315 (defining stereotypes as “cognitive structures that contain our
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a social group”); Duncan, supra
note 23, at 591 (defining stereotypes as “the general inclination to place a person in categories according to some easily and quickly identifiable characteristic such as age, sex, ethnic membership, nationality, or occupation, and then to
attribute to him qualities believed to be typical of that category”).
34. Kang, supra note 7, at 1500 (referring to attitudes as “emotions, feelings, and evaluations”); see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 948
(defining attitudes as “an evaluative disposition—that is, the tendency to like
or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or something.
Explicit expressions of attitudes occur frequently, whenever we say we like or
dislike someone or something.”).
35. See Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The
Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 856, 857 n.1 (2001).
36. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996); Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 8.
37. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 266; see also Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1144 –45 (2000); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (2004); Kang, supra note
7, at 1503; Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1085.
38. Psychologists define behaviors as including “differential evaluations,
judgments, and physical behaviors.” Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 21 n.98.
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of certain citizens based upon their racial appearance. Second,
these biases can affect the evaluation of ambiguous behavior,
causing identical behavior to be interpreted differently depending upon the racial appearance of the person performing the
act.39 Finally, implicit biases can cause individuals to treat
members of different racial groups disparately.40
1. Increased Scrutiny
Researchers consistently find that blacks, especially young
black men, capture attention before whites do.41 This occurs
nonconsciously and automatically.42 Scientists attribute this
difference in attention to the fact that people have automatic
and rapid threat reactions toward black men.43 Indeed, brain
scans demonstrate that people show more activation of the
amygdala, a portion of the brain associated with fear, when
viewing faces of black men versus white men.44
For a discussion of the behavioral effects of implicit bias, see David M. Amodio
& Patricia G. Devine, Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Race Bias: Evidence for Independent Constructs and Unique Effects on Behavior, 91 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 653–54 (2006).
39. See infra Part II.B.2.
40. See infra Part II.B.3.
41. Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based Patterns of
Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1326–27 (2008).
42. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883, 885–87 (2004)
(finding that research subjects, primed with crime-related words or photographs below the level of conscious awareness, were drawn to black faces earlier and for longer time periods than to white faces).
43. Trawalter et al., supra note 41, at 1322.
44. E.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of RaceRelated Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720, 721 (2005). The strength of amygdala activation correlates with implicit bias scores related to racial attitudes.
Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729, 730–
33 (2000). Researchers found stronger amygdala responses when they presented the pictures of black faces subliminally. William A. Cunningham et al.,
Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 806, 809 (2004) (finding that the stronger reactions were correlated significantly with scores from the Implicit Association Test (IAT)—a test
which reveals implicit biases); Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the
Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11
NEUROREPORT 2351, 2353 (2000) (demonstrating that subjects showed greater
amygdala activation to outgroup faces); Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 SCIENCE 785, 785–86
(2005) (demonstrating that humans more readily show a fear response to outgroup members); Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 164, 165 (2008) (noting that amygdala activation is
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Surprisingly, conscious racial attitudes do not predict attentional bias.45 Rather, what predicts how quickly an individual’s attention is automatically (nonconsciously) drawn to
blacks is the strength of the perceiver’s implicit association between blacks and danger.46 Those for whom the implicit blackdanger association is highly accessible47 are quicker to pay attention to black faces than white faces. These individuals also
tend to pay attention for longer periods of time to black individuals, though this increase in attentional holding of black
faces versus white faces is marginal.48 Those for whom the
danger stereotype is not as accessible do not demonstrate attentional bias.49

2. Biased Evaluations
For over sixty years, social psychologists have demonstrated that black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and
dangerous.50 That these cultural stereotypes affect the evaluation of behaviors performed by blacks was powerfully demonstrated in a study that required participants to rate ambiguous

associated with fear). But see Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling
Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 61 (2005) (demonstrating that amygdala activation to outgroup members is not inevitable). Researchers have also found that
a variety of physiological responses occur when whites are exposed to blacks,
including sweating, increased heart rate, facial twitches, and increased eye
blink. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181, 183 (2005)
[hereinafter Eberhardt, Imaging Race].
45. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, supra note 44, at 183–84; Eberhardt et al.,
supra note 42, at 884 –85 (finding no correlation between the explicit biases
and reaction times of study participants).
46. Nicole C. Donders et al., Danger Stereotypes Predict Racially Biased
Attentional Allocation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1328, 1332 (2008).
47. Accessibility refers to how quickly and easily a particular idea or concept comes to mind, consciously or nonconsciously. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY
E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 60 (2008)
(“[F]requently activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that have
not been activated.”).
48. Donders et al., supra note 46, at 1331.
49. Id. at 1332.
50. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 876 (“The stereotype of black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for
almost 60 years.” (citations omitted)); Trawalter et al., supra note 41, 1322
(“There is overwhelming evidence that young black men are stereotyped as
violent, criminal, and dangerous, . . . both implicitly as well as explicitly.” (citations omitted)); see also Devine & Elliot, supra note 22, at 1139; Duncan, supra note 23, at 591.
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physical contact between two people. The researcher hypothesized:
If one believes that blacks are more prone to violent acts than whites,
it is reasonable to assume that the concept of violence is more accessible when viewing a black than when viewing a white committing
the same act. In other words, the threshold for labeling an act as violent [would be] lower when viewing a black actor than when viewing a
white actor.51

To test this hypothesis, researchers had white subjects
watch a video of two men engaged in a discussion that grew increasingly heated.52 The subjects were unaware that the men
were actors following a script. Instead, they were told that they
were observing a discussion occurring in another room.53
Researchers asked the subjects to rate the behavior of the
two men at various points during the discussion. Eventually,
one man pushed the other and the subjects had the option of
rating the contact as horsing around, dramatic, aggressive, or
violent.54 Researchers manipulated the race of the pusher and
the victim in the videos to test whether race would affect the
subjects’ perceptions of the push.55
Remarkably, the actor’s race significantly influenced how
subjects evaluated the contact. When the victim was white and
the person initiating the physical contact was black, seventyfive percent of the subjects interpreted the shove as violent.56
Only six percent described it as horsing around or dramatic.57
The results were markedly different when the victim was black
and the pusher was white. In this scenario, only seventeen percent of the subjects labeled the contact as violent.58 Instead,
forty-two percent of the subjects rated the white perpetrator as
horsing around or being dramatic.59 Finally, when the two actors were black, the perpetrator’s behavior was rated as more
aggressive than when the two individuals were white—sixtynine percent versus thirteen percent.60

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Duncan, supra note 23, at 591 (citation omitted).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 594 –95.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The race of the individuals also affected whether the research subjects attributed the shove to an individual’s disposition or to situational factors. Again, researchers observed statistically significant differences. When the harmdoer was black,
subjects attributed the shove to dispositional characteristics.61
Yet, when the harmdoer was white, subjects more often attributed the shove to situational factors.62
The researchers concluded that negative stereotypes associating blacks with violence explained why the subjects evaluated ambiguous behaviors as more aggressive when performed by a black actor as opposed to a white actor.63 The
presence of a black individual automatically brought negative
black stereotypes such as violence to the forefront of the subject’s memory, making the trait more available for use in evaluating ambiguous behavior.64
Other studies support the finding that individuals evaluate
blacks more negatively than whites engaged in identical behavior. In one study, black and white school-age children rated an
ambiguous bump in the hallway as more aggressive when performed by a black actor rather than a white actor.65 In another,
subjects evaluated the same facial expression as more hostile
on a black face than on a white face.66 In a third study using
buttons labeled “shoot” and “don’t shoot” as a weapon’s trigger,
the nonconscious activation of negative black stereotypes
caused individuals more quickly to shoot a potentially hostile
black than a potentially hostile white.67 Importantly, a recent

61. Id. at 596.
62. Id. at 597.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 7–8
(1989) (demonstrating that nonconscious activation of negative black racial
stereotypes results in evaluating ambiguous behavior as aggressive).
65. H. Andrew Sager & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral
Cues in Black and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive
Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595–96 (1980).
66. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 342, 342–45 (2004); see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial
Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (demonstrating that implicit bias
scores predicted how long it took white participants to judge when a hostile
expression on a black face became nonhostile).
67. Correll, Dilemma, supra note 22, at 1317–18; B. Keith Payne, Weapon
Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT
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study demonstrates that extensive training can reduce this effect in police officers.68
Negative black stereotypes also influence the evaluation of
police behavior toward blacks. For instance, in one study, researchers wanted to determine whether the stereotype associating blacks with apes would affect how research subjects
evaluated police behavior.69 The researchers found that white
research subjects who had been shown images of apes subliminally (below the level of conscious awareness) were more likely
to conclude that the police were justified in beating a black
suspect than when they were not shown images of apes.70 However, viewing images of apes did not affect the subjects’ evaluation of the police beating a white suspect.71
Taken together, the science provides evidence that how
people evaluate the behavior of others can depend on the race
of the individual observed. This effect occurs without the evaluators being aware of the impact of race on their interpretation
of behavior.72 This realization demonstrates the need to be cognizant of implicit biases and to address them when thinking
about solutions to the disparate treatment of blacks within the
criminal justice system.
3. Biased Treatment and Behavioral Confirmation
Negative stereotypes and unfavorable attitudes toward
blacks can cause individuals to treat them differently than
nonstereotyped group members. One of the first experiments
demonstrating this involved white subjects interviewing “job

DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006) (noting that split-second decisions
limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial stereotypes).
68. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1006, 1020–22 (2007) [hereinafter Correll, Thin Blue Line] (finding that although police officers activate negative black stereotypes, they do not exhibit
shooter bias to the same extent as civilians, and suggesting that this is the result of their extensive training). For a fuller discussion, see infra notes 250–66
and accompanying text.
69. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 293 (2008).
70. Id. at 302.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 304.

2011]

ARREST EFFICIENCY

2049

applicants.”73 Researchers trained the purported applicants to
respond to interview questions in a standard format so that any
differences in the treatment they received from the interviewer
would be attributable to race.
The results demonstrated that white interviewers treated
black and white job applicants differently.74 When the applicant was black, the white interviewer maintained greater physical distance, made more speech errors, and ended the interview sooner than when the applicant was white.75 Researchers
concluded that these behavioral differences resulted from the
negative stereotypical beliefs the white interviewers held about
the black job applicants.76
This interview study did not specifically test whether implicit bias caused the negative treatment of blacks. However,
more recent experiments make this connection. In one, researchers asked participants to complete an exceedingly tedious computer task consisting of 130 trials.77 Before each trial,
the participants were primed78 subliminally with photos of either black or white faces. On the 130th trial, as planned, the
computer program crashed and researchers told the participants that they would have to begin the entire task from the
beginning.79
Researchers videotaped the participants’ reactions to this
news and later coded their reactions for hostility. The results
demonstrated that subjects primed with black faces reacted
with more hostility to the news than those primed with white
faces.80 This occurred, the researchers concluded, because those
73. Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 112
(1974).
74. Id. at 114 –15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 119.
77. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238.
78. Priming makes concepts temporarily more accessible from memory
and therefore facilitates a person’s ability to evaluate similar concepts more
quickly. John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information
Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented
Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 438–39 (1982); Devine, supra note 64, at 8–9. Here, the
priming was subliminal, which means it occurred below the level of conscious
awareness. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238. Subliminal priming can be
achieved by flashing words or pictures on a screen so quickly that subjects are
unaware that they have seen images or words. Id.
79. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 238.
80. Id. at 239.
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primed with black faces automatically activated negative black
stereotypes that then affected their behavior.81 Surprisingly,
subjects acted more aggressively after the black-face prime, regardless of whether they had negative attitudes toward
blacks.82
This study does not suggest that individuals will inevitably
respond with aggression whenever black stereotype activation
occurs. Rather, stereotype activation can cause aggressive behavior in situations where aggression is one possible appropriate response. For example, when the computer crashed after
approximately ten minutes of tedious work, reacting with aggression or patience were both appropriate behavioral responses. The activation of negative black stereotypes tipped the
balance in favor of an aggressive response.
The negative treatment that blacks receive can cause them
to respond in kind. This is known as the self-fulfilling prophecy
or behavioral confirmation effect.83 Returning to the job interview study discussed at the beginning of this section, researchers conducted a follow-up experiment to test whether a job applicant would reciprocate the interviewer’s negative nonverbal
behaviors, causing the applicant “to behave in a way that confirms the original false definition.”84 The researchers trained
white interviewers to give white job applicants either the “black
treatment” or the “white treatment.”85 The “black treatment”
replicated how the black job applicants had been treated in the
earlier study.86 Thus, interviewers who gave applicants the
black treatment maintained greater physical distance, made
more speech errors, and ended the interview more quickly.87 Interviewers who gave subjects the white treatment did the opposite.88
The job interviews were videotaped and, later, individuals
who were unaware of the nature of the experiment viewed the
tapes and rated the applicant’s competence for the job. Just as
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation
Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation,
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 542 (1997).
84. Word et al., supra note 73, at 109.
85. Id. at 115–19. The phrases “black treatment” and “white treatment”
are my words for the experimental conditions.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 116–17.
88. Id.
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the researchers predicted, the interviewer’s behavior toward
the applicant affected the applicant’s behavior, which in turn
affected how he was judged.89 Those applicants receiving the
white treatment obtained better competence ratings.90 The
study provides evidence that racial stereotypes influence interpersonal interactions, causing stigmatized groups to react in
ways that confirm the stereotype.91
In another study testing self-fulfilling prophecy effects, researchers paired white subjects to take part in a word-guessing
game.92 Before beginning, one member of the pair was subliminally primed with either a black face or a white face. Later, individuals unaware of the priming judged the subjects for hostility. The results demonstrated that not only was the player
primed with the black face judged as more hostile, but the
player paired with that subject was also rated as acting with
greater hostility.93
Numerous researchers note that the originators of negative
behavior will likely be “blissfully unaware . . . of the causal role
that their own activities play in generating the behavioral evidence that erroneously confirms their expectations.”94 One researcher puts it thus:
[B]ecause the effect of the stereotype on behavior was nonconscious—
the perceiver would have no conscious experience of choosing that
mode of behavior. Thus, the perceiver’s subjective, phenomenal experience, and hence memory of the event, would be of the stereotyped
group member’s unprovoked initial hostility. . . . But because one is
not aware of one’s own role in provoking it, one may attribute it to the
stereotyped group member (and, hence, the group).95

89. Id. at 117–19.
90. Id. at 118.
91. Id. at 119–20.
92. Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 548.
93. Id. at 552.
94. Id. at 544 (omission in original) (citation omitted); David L. Hamilton
& Tima K. Trolier, Sterotypes and Sterotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive
Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 150, 150 (John F. Dovido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (“Given the perceiver’s awareness of
the confirmatory nature of the target’s behavior and lack of awareness of his
or her own role in producing it, it would seem particularly difficult to convince
the perceiver that his or her stereotypic beliefs are wrong.”).
95. Bargh et al., supra note 36, at 242; see also Eric J. Vanman et al., The
Modern Face of Prejudice and Structural Features that Moderate the Effect of
Cooperation on Affect, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 941, 947 (1997)
(demonstrating that whites asked to imagine working with black partners
rated blacks more favorably, yet their involuntary physical responses, as
measured with electromyography (EMG), were indicative of negative affect).
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This behavioral confirmation effect “provide[s] a powerful
mechanism by which stereotypes and prejudicial behavior are
maintained, propagated and justified” since “the perceiver interprets the target’s behavior in line with the expectancy and
encodes yet another instance of stereotype-consistent behavior.”96
In conclusion, the results of over three decades of research
provide disturbing evidence that implicit biases can influence
how individuals respond to and interact with black Americans.
These effects can occur spontaneously and without conscious
intention. Individuals are often unaware that race had any effect on their behavior. Whether one consciously subscribes to
negative stereotypes or holds racist attitudes, the mere presence of a black individual, or reminders of things stereotypically associated with blacks, can cause the automatic activation of
negative stereotypes. This automatic activation makes traits
associated with the stereotype, such as violence or aggression,
more accessible and available for use in making judgments or
evaluating behavior.97
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICE-CITIZEN INTERACTIONS
Based on the science, it is reasonable to conclude that the
police target, stop, and search blacks more often than whites
based upon the operation of implicit biases. Implicit biases affect whether behavior catches attention in the first place and
whether the observer will interpret that behavior as sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. The science demonstrates that people can interpret identical behavior differently depending upon the racial appearance of the individual engaged in it.
96. Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 542.
97. Duncan, supra note 23, at 591; see also John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, 10 ADVANCES SOC. COGNITION 3 (1997); John A. Bargh,
The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and
Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note
32, at 1, 1–2; Chen & Bargh, supra note 83, at 545–46; Daniel T. Gilbert,
Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference
Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189, 194 (James S. Uleman & John A.
Bargh eds., 1989); James S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible Interpreters: Evidence and Issues from Spontaneous Trait Inference, 28 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 215–16 (1996) (describing and reviewing
literature on spontaneous trait inference). For a more recent treatment discussing both automatic and controlled processes from a dual-process model
perspective, see generally Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes,
107 PSYCHOL. REV. 101 (2000).
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Hence, police attention may be drawn to black individuals
in general, and to young men who look stereotypically black in
particular,98 regardless of whether these individuals are engaged in suspicious behavior. Once their attention is captured,
automatic stereotype activation can cause officers to interpret
behavior as aggressive, violent, or suspicious even if identical
behavior performed by a white individual would not be so interpreted.99 When officers approach the individual to confirm or
dispel their suspicions, implicit biases can cause officers to behave aggressively without realizing it.100 The confronted individual may respond in kind, fulfilling officers’ beliefs that the
individual is suspicious and aggressive. This entire series of
events, triggered not by conscious racial animus but by implicit
racial biases, will likely result in officers conducting a frisk. All
the while, officers will be unaware that the behavioral effects of
their implicit bias triggered the entire chain of events. In the
end, officers may stop and frisk black individuals, whom they
would not have deemed suspicious if they had been white, not
because of bigotry or conscious considerations of race, but because of implicit cognitions.

98. In one study, not only did police officers choose black faces more often
than white faces when asked “Who looks criminal?,” but they also chose more
stereotypically black faces more often. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 888–
89. The same significant effects did not occur when officers were asked to identify white faces. Id. Officers (mis)remembered black individuals despite the
fact that the officers paid more attention to the black faces than the white faces. Id. at 887–88. The ratings of how stereotypical an individual appeared
were obtained from participants (who were not involved in the final study)
who were asked to view a series of photographs of black and white individuals
and to rate them based upon the physical criteria most often associated with
either race. Id. at 888.
In another study examining sentencing patterns in death cases, researchers found that the more stereotypically black features a criminal defendant
had (broad nose, dark skin, thick lips), the more likely he was to receive a
death sentence or a longer sentence. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts CapitalSentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 385 (2006); see also Irene V. Blair
et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 677 (2004) (finding that intrarace inmates with more Afrocentric features received longer sentences despite the same criminal histories);
Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming?
Cue-Based Versus Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 17 (2002) (finding that individuals showed
more implicit bias when viewing blacks who had more “prototypic” features).
99. See supra Part I.B.
100. See supra Part I.B.
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Importantly, although empirical evidence demonstrates
that implicit biases are ubiquitous, they are also malleable.101
It is possible to exacerbate or moderate their effects on behavior. Generally, an individual’s motivations and goals, as well as
situational factors, can influence implicit biases.102 For instance, implicit biases can be reduced through conscious
awareness, conscious motivation and commitments to egalitarianism, and intentional decisions to react a certain way upon
encountering a stereotyped individual.103 Even asking people to
be nonprejudiced can reduce implicit biases.104 Consequently,
courts and police departments may be able to implement strat101. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001) (discussing mental imagery studies that demonstrate that stereotypes are malleable); Blair, supra note 29 (reviewing literature that tests whether automatic stereotypes are malleable); Jost et al., supra note 5, at 44 –45; Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 18–20 (“[R]esearch
provides suggestive but not indisputable evidence for the possibility that
people may inhibit the activation of stereotypes in some circumstances.”);
Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 44, at 61–62 (demonstrating that amygdala activation to outgroup members is not inevitable). Evidence of malleability is also
found in neuroscientific studies. Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at 76–80. In
fact, certain studies demonstrate that some people who are low in prejudice
may not activate racial stereotypes at all. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31 at
15–16. One study demonstrated that exposure to positive examples of outgroup members could reduce implicit biases. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony
G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806–07 (2001). But see Jennifer A. JoyGaba & Brian Nosek, The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial
Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2010) (finding that while malleability was shown after exposure to counterstereotypical racial group members, the
effects were weak).
102. Blair, supra note 29. One well-known researcher in the field of social
cognition has identified five motives that may influence automatic processes:
belonging (the motivation to conform to the ingroup’s social norms), understanding (the motivation to share understandings with an ingroup), controlling (the motivation to individuate others in an attempt to accurately predict
outcomes), enhancing the self (the motivation to protect one’s self-image), and
trusting (the motivation to trust one’s ingroup, which usually means distrusting the outgroup). Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended
Thought and Social Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES.
117, 123–24 (2004).
103. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 18–20.
104. See, e.g., Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic
Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 852 (2001); see also
Nilanjana Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Role of Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in
HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note
30, at 267, 278–79.
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egies for reducing their effects on behavior.105 More specifics
concerning the factors affecting the malleability of implicit biases are considered in Part III.
Although the scientific evidence has much to contribute to
understandings of police decisionmaking and judgment, judges
continue to employ common-sense, intuitive theories of human
behavior in crafting Fourth Amendment legal standards. As a
result, the Court’s stop-and-frisk jurisprudence not only fails to
achieve the appropriate balance between privacy and security,
but also exacerbates the effects of implicit bias on behavior,
leading to arrest inefficiencies.106 Part II examines the Court’s
105. For an extended and thoughtful discussion of techniques to increase
“accountability-based policing” to address racial profiling, including suggestions for police training, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 145–207
(2002). In many important ways, Harris’s suggestions acknowledge the importance of “situationism,” the recognition in social psychology that the situation
and the pressures they impose have a more influential effect on behavior than
a person’s “disposition” or personality. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003);
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 1. Part IV of this Article builds from and adds
to Harris’s significant work. Importantly, however, social psychologists are
skeptical that accountability alone is sufficient to reduce implicit biases. See
Jost et al., supra note 5, at 50, 62.
106. Some argue that the differential treatment of blacks is not evidence of
explicit or implicit bias. Rather, it simply reflects differential crime rates. See,
e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1036 n.41 (2006). There are a number of responses to this. First, the statistics on hit rates suggest that we
should be cautious about making this claim. Second, as Angela Davis has argued, it is difficult to use arrest statistics as evidence of criminality when the
process of arrest involves so much discretion that “arrest statistics may both
overestimate and underestimate actual criminal behavior. Furthermore, because no uniform method of documenting an officer’s decision not to arrest exists, we cannot know the extent to which such decisions skew the arrest statistics currently used as evidence of criminality within particular racial groups.”
Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1996); see also Coker, supra note 20, at 831–44 (critiquing reliance on crime statistics). In any case, even if the differential treatment of blacks based upon the accuracy of the stereotype is rational, it may
still be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L.
REV. 825, 848 (2003) (“The prohibition of rational discrimination is a central
component of antidiscrimination doctrine—and it may be the most important
aspect of antidiscrimination law on the ground.”). For additional responses in
the literature challenging the claim that it is rational to focus law enforcement
attention on blacks because there is a relationship between race and crime,
see generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME 53–74 (2d
ed. 2009), and Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781,
790–801 (1994).
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stop-and-frisk jurisprudence using the tools of behavioral realism.
II. EXPOSING THE DOCTRINE
This Part examines the behavioral assumptions embedded
in the Fourth Amendment’s stop-and-frisk doctrine and tests
them against the scientific evidence. Section A studies Terry v.
Ohio, the case that scrutinized and sanctioned police stop-andfrisk practices. Section B unmasks the flawed behavioral assumptions contained in the doctrine and section C traces the
outlines of some new doctrinal approaches that take into account the best empirical social-science evidence concerning decisionmaking and judgment.
A. TERRY V. OHIO
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court, for the first time, permitted officers to seize individuals and conduct a limited frisk for weapons in the absence of probable cause but with the suspicion that
the individual was armed and engaged in criminal activity.107
The facts of Terry are as follows.108 Officer McFadden was on
the lookout for shoplifters and pickpockets in the middle of the
afternoon in downtown Cleveland.109 At some point, he noticed
Terry and Chilton standing on a street corner.110 McFadden
could not articulate “precisely what first drew his eye to
them.”111 They just “didn’t look right,”112 he testified, even
though they were dressed in topcoats, customary attire at the
time.113 “[T]o be truthful,” he admitted, “I didn’t like them.”114
Both Terry and Chilton were black.115
McFadden watched the two men for ten minutes as they
took turns walking down the street, looking into a store win107. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
108. I only discuss the facts important to my analysis.
109. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id. For McFadden’s full testimony, see State of Ohio v. Richard D.
Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and
Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387, 1449 (1998) [hereinafter Suppression Hearing].
112. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
113. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74
MISS. L.J. 423, 430 (2004).
114. Suppression Hearing, supra note 111, at 1456.
115. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 964 (1999).
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dow, and returning.116 Their behavior led McFadden to suspect
that the two were casing a store in preparation for a daytime
robbery.117 Without probable cause,118 McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him around, frisked him, and found a concealed weapon.119
The issue before the Court was whether the Fourth
Amendment permitted officers to seize and frisk individuals in
the absence of probable cause.120 The Court answered the question in the affirmative. It held that reasonable suspicion, and
not the traditional probable cause standard, authorized officers
to detain individuals for questioning and to conduct a limited
search for weapons.121 In order to justify what is colloquially
known as a “stop and frisk,”122 the reasonable suspicion test requires an officer “to point to specific and articulable facts which
. . . lead[] him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot”123 or that the individual
with whom he is interacting is armed and dangerous.124
At the time Terry was decided, police stop-and-frisk practices were under intense scrutiny primarily because of their
role in aggravating racial tensions between black communities
and the police. Professor Tracey Maclin points out that the
Court decided Terry only three months after a presidential
116. See Katz, supra note 113, at 431.
117. See id. at 432–33.
118. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth
Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 894 (1998)
(“[N]o one really suggested that Officer McFadden in Terry had ‘probable
cause’ to believe much of anything.”).
119. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968) (describing the search of Terry).
120. See id. at 4.
121. As other scholars have noted, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was not
crystal clear on the appropriate standard for conducting a stop and frisk. See,
e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1308–09 (1998) [hereinafter
Maclin, Legacy]. However, the Terry decision now stands for the proposition
that reasonable suspicion is the guiding standard for stops and frisks. See, e.g.,
John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 R’s of Drug Testing in Public Schools, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 1221, 1227 n.39 (1996).
122. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. This was distinguished from other searches under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“In other
words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or
searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause.”). Probable
cause is the “traditional standard” of the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
123. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30.
124. Id. at 27.
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commission examining the 1967 race riots concluded that “hostility between the police and the black community was a contributing factor, and in some places, the factor, precipitating
riots in several urban centers.”125 The Justices were also aware
of the 1967 Report of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that criticized policing
practices, including the “aggressive patrol tactics” used in communities of color.126
On the one hand, then, the Justices did not have “universal
trust in the neutrality of the authorities.”127 Clearly, allowing
officers to detain and frisk individuals solely on suspicion of
criminal activity was a power subject to abuse.128 In fact, the
decision represents one of the few instances in which the Court
acknowledged issues of race in the Fourth Amendment context.129 On the other hand, the Court did not want to be “agents
who tied the hands of the police in dealing with intensely dangerous and recurring situations on city streets.”130
Through the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court attempted a delicate balance, granting police the discretion to
stop and frisk suspicious individuals while attempting simultaneously to protect individuals from unjustified encroachments
upon their liberty and bodily integrity. The Court specifically
noted that its decision should not “be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative
sphere . . . . [C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility
to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the ob-

125. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV.
333, 363–65 (1998) [hereinafter Maclin, Race] (citations omitted). The Kerner
Commission found that “‘[n]egroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police.’” Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS 158 (1968)).
126. Dudley Jr., supra note 118, at 893; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11
(citing the report).
127. Dudley Jr., supra note 118, at 893.
128. Id.
129. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14; see also Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 364 –65
(“[T]he Court signaled, albeit in an enigmatic footnote, that the judiciary must
consider racial impact when determining the constitutional reasonableness of
an intrusion.”).
130. Dudley, supra note 118, at 893.
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jective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”131
In keeping with its goal of cabining police discretion while
simultaneously allowing the police to act on their suspicions in
appropriate cases, the Court attempted to craft a test that prohibited officers from acting on their “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or ‘hunch[es],’” including racial hunches.132 Instead, “in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts.”133 “Anything less,” the Court cautioned, “would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.”134
The next section exposes and examines the implicit behavioral theories of police judgment and decisionmaking embedded
in Terry and its progeny. It tests these theories against the
available scientific evidence and reveals their flaws. The section demonstrates that when the influence of implicit biases on
policing is considered, the reasonable suspicion test may not be
up to the task of preventing intrusions based upon nothing
more than hunches. Rather, the test may facilitate policing that
inadequately protects liberty while simultaneously failing to
further effective law enforcement.
B. BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS
From the beginning, Terry has been the subject of sustained critiques.135 I join those critiques because they reveal
131. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id. at 21.
134. Id. at 22.
135. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 43, 43 (2009) (arguing that Terry and Whren help create and
maintain racialized spaces); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1035–36 (2002); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the
Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 671, 675 (2009); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 681
(1994) [hereinafter Harris, Factors] (describing the profiling of high-crime
neighborhoods); David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of
Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Frisking]; Lenese
C. Herbert, Bête Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security,
9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 155–57 (2003) (critiquing doctrinal failures to address race-based policing); Katz, supra note 113, at 424; Andrew D. Leipold,
Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent
in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 568–69 (1998); Maclin, Race,
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that Terry allows officers to act on conscious racial biases.
However, largely absent from these prior critiques and suggestions for Terry reform is consideration of the effects of nonconscious racial biases on police behavior.136
Considering the effects of implicit biases on police behavior
and decisionmaking is important for several reasons. First,
doing so reveals that even officers who do not consciously consider race while policing may unintentionally treat blacks more
harshly and with more suspicion than whites. Furthermore, for
those officers who do engage in race-conscious policing, implicit
biases will exacerbate the effects of race on their judgments
and behavior. Thus, doctrinal solutions that only address the
problems of conscious racial profiling while ignoring the effects
of implicit bias will likely fail to remedy arbitrary policing.
Second, basing the doctrine on erroneous assumptions
about police decisionmaking and judgment has the unintended
effect of strengthening implicit biases. This is problematic because implicit biases can cause real harm. As a result of such
biases, police officers in simulations were more likely to shoot
unarmed black suspects than unarmed white suspects,137 and
to misidentify black suspects more readily than white suspects.138 Thus, the harm created by current doctrine is greater
than scholars have previously recognized; the doctrine not only
encourages racial stereotyping by supporting the idea that race
is relevant to assessing criminality, but it also makes reducing
the effects of implicit biases on behavior more difficult.139

supra note 125, at 340–41; Maclin, Legacy, supra note 121, at 1272–73;
Thompson, supra note 115, at 961; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of
African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional
Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 443 (2004).
136. But see Thompson, supra note 115, at 983–86 (using cognitive psychology to examine Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). This Article builds
from Thompson’s approach by introducing the science of implicit bias, which
was not fully developed at the time of his article. See Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications, 86 OR. L.
REV. 657, 678 (2007) (discussing cognitive biases and the regulatory response
to racial profiling).
137. E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for
Police Officers’ Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 182
(2005); see also Correll, Dilemma, supra note 22, at 1325 (same, but with civilians). But see Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1020 (finding that police performed better than civilians and attributing this result to training).
138. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 887–88.
139. See infra Part III.A (discussing studies that demonstrate how practicing stereotypical associations can increase implicit bias).
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Finally, the failure to consider the effects of implicit biases
on behavior can result in suggestions for doctrinal reform that
unintentionally exacerbate arbitrary policing. For example, in
his groundbreaking article utilizing cognitive psychology to examine the racial component of Terry stops, Professor Anthony
Thompson recommended that courts should, in some instances,
permit officers to utilize race to justify Terry stops.140 Race
would be used “not [as] a predictor of criminality . . . [but as] a
rough but workable proxy for suspicion in certain circumstances.”141 Judges would then “scrutinize the officer’s motivations to determine if the circumstances in a given case warranted this reliance on race.”142
While the proposal seems sensible, a number of problems
remain when viewed from the perspective of implicit bias.
First, the proposal is underinclusive because it only affects
those cases where an officer consciously relies on race. Hence,
this solution does not address cases involving an officer who is
genuinely unaware that race influenced his behaviors, perceptions, and judgments. Second, the proposal encourages the police to intentionally and consciously associate race with criminal suspicion, which may tend to exacerbate or strengthen
implicit biases.
The sections that follow scrutinize the flawed behavioral
assumptions contained in current doctrine. These faulty assumptions result in a jurisprudence that fails to protect nonwhites from arbitrary policing.
1. Interpretation of Ambiguous Behavior
In Terry, the Court constructed a test that allows officers to
stop and frisk an individual based upon their interpretation of
the individual’s ambiguous behavior.143 The test requires officers to justify stops and frisks by articulating the facts that led
them to be reasonably suspicious of the individual.144 Given the
Court’s acknowledgement that stop-and-frisk practices could be
used to harass blacks, the articulation requirement can be interpreted, in part, as the Court’s attempt to cabin officer discretion to stop and frisk blacks based upon racial hunches.145 In140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Thompson, supra note 115, at 1005.
Id.
Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
See id. at 21, 30.
Id. at 14.
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stead, officers can only stop and frisk individuals when their
behavior is objectively suspicious, regardless of their race.146
The behavioral assumption underlying the reasonable suspicion test is that a well-intentioned officer147 is capable of interpreting identical behavior similarly, regardless of the race of
the individual they are observing. While this behavioral assumption is intuitively appealing, it does not withstand scientific scrutiny. Officers may nonconsciously use a more lenient
standard when judging the behavior of whites versus blacks.
The science demonstrates that race can affect an officer’s
interpretation of ambiguous behavior.148 Nonconscious stereotype activation in the presence of black individuals can cause
officers to interpret ambiguous behaviors performed by blacks
as suspicious, aggressive, and dangerous while similar behaviors engaged in by whites would go unnoticed.149 Implicit biases
may affect even officers who do their best to avoid (consciously)
treating people differently based upon race.
The implicit racial bias that may cause an officer to interpret ambiguous behaviors engaged in by blacks as suspicious
can be understood as an inarticulable racial hunch. That is because the officer’s feelings of suspicion are not based upon some
objective and unambiguously suspicious behavior that he would
inevitably have considered suspicious regardless of the race of
the person engaged in it. Rather, his evaluation of the behavior
as suspicious may be unintentionally influenced by nonconscious, inarticulable racial biases—in other words, a nonconscious racial hunch.
Upon feeling suspicious, an officer easily can articulate the
specific facts that he believes led him to feel suspicious without
realizing that his initial feelings of suspicion may have been
based on a racial hunch caused by the operation of implicit racial bias. In other words, the officer will not realize that if the
individual he had observed had been white, he may not have
noticed the behavior or may have interpreted it as horseplay.
By allowing officers to act on their interpretation of ambiguous
146. Id. at 30 (holding that officers may stop and frisk when “criminal activity may be afoot”).
147. I focus on the well-intentioned officer because, as the Terry Court acknowledged, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment is likely ill
equipped to deter officers who choose to harass blacks with little regard for
whether evidence will be admissible in court.
148. See Duncan, supra note 23, at 591.
149. Id.
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behaviors, the reasonable suspicion test actually permits, rather than prevents, actions based upon racial hunches.
2. Officer Experience
When determining whether an officer’s stop and frisk is
justified by reasonable suspicion, the Terry Court wrote that
“due weight must be given . . . to the specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.”150 This deference is justified by the belief that an experienced officer can “draw[] inferences and
make[] deductions [from facts] . . . that might well elude an untrained person.”151
The Court’s behavioral assumption is that officers, based
upon their experiences, are better than civilians at distinguishing innocent from guilty conduct. Presumably, as frequent observers of behavior, officers are better equipped to predict
whether an individual’s behavior signals involvement in criminal activity.152 However, as with many common-sense beliefs
about human behavior, this assumption goes too far. As the following two sections demonstrate, the nature of their jobs may
lead officers to perform no better than civilians when it comes
to differentiating criminal from noncriminal activity. They perhaps may perform even worse in situations where nonwhites
are involved.
a. Thinking About Crime
First, research demonstrates that thinking about crime can
trigger nonconscious thoughts about blacks, which in turn activates negative black stereotypes.153 Researchers have found
150. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
151. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); see also Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“[A] reviewing court should take care
. . . to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by . . . local law enforcement officers . . . . Through the lens of his police experience and expertise.”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (deference is due to the “observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the
untrained observer”).
152. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2 (“This situation is to be distinguished from
the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive
and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to
the untrained observer.”).
153. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 876 (“The stereotype of
Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by social psychologists for almost 60 years.”).
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that the connection between blacks and crime has become entrenched and ubiquitous.154 Disturbingly, not only does seeing a
black individual bring negative racial stereotypes to mind nonconsciously,155 but simply thinking about crime triggers implicit thoughts about blacks in police officers and civilians alike.156
The researchers concluded that “[n]ot only are Blacks thought
of as criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black.”157 This
means that
automatic associations [between Blacks and crime] may be activated
and practiced substantially more than previously recognized—even in
the absence of initial exposure to a social group member. In a crimeobsessed culture, for example, simply thinking of crime can lead perceivers to conjure up images of Black Americans that “ready” these
perceivers to register and selectively attend to Black people who may
be present in the actual physical environment.158

Officers performing their job-related duties are necessarily
thinking about crime, which activates implicit stereotypes of
blacks.
Once activated, these implicit stereotypes can cause officers nonconsciously to pay more attention to blacks than to
whites.159 Then, these implicit biases may cause officers to interpret the ambiguous behaviors of blacks as suspicious and
criminal.160
For instance, when looking for drug couriers161 at an airport, an officer nonconsciously may pay more attention to
blacks and view their behaviors as suspicious while failing to
notice similar behavior engaged in by whites. United States v.
Mendenhall provides an example of this phenomenon.162 In
that case, two Drug Enforcement Agency agents were at an
airport in Detroit on the lookout for illegal drug trafficking.163
They became suspicious of twenty-two-year-old Sylvia Mendenhall as she disembarked from a plane arriving from Los An154. See id. (describing the association between blacks and crime as
“strong,” “consistent,” “frequent,” and “automatic”).
155. See supra Part II.B.
156. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 877–78.
157. Id. at 883.
158. Id. at 877.
159. Id. at 877–78, 886–87.
160. Id.
161. These profiles consist of an “informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (1980).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 547.
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geles,164 a source city for much of the heroin brought into Detroit.165
According to their testimony, they found her suspicious because she was the last person to leave the plane, she “‘appeared
to be very nervous,’” and she “‘completely scanned the whole
area’” before proceeding to baggage claim.166 Their suspicions
were sufficiently aroused that they followed her.167 The officers
testified that they became more suspicious when she walked
past the baggage claim area without retrieving any luggage168
and when they overheard her obtain a boarding pass from the
ticket counter of another airline.169
Although the agents’ suspicions had been aroused, all of
Mendenhall’s actions were consistent with innocence. She was
engaged in “the kind of behavior that could reasonably be expected of anyone changing planes in an airport terminal.”170
She could have been the last person to disembark because the
airline had assigned her a seat in the last row. She might have
appeared nervous because she was afraid of missing a connecting flight. Perhaps she scanned the arrival area after disembarking to find signs leading her to baggage claim, to the exit,
or to another terminal. The fact that Los Angeles is a source
city for heroin is only important to the extent that it explains
why the agents were watching arrivals from this particular
plane. Standing alone, it does not sufficiently explain the
agents’ specific focus on Mendenhall since everyone leaving
that plane would have been arriving from Los Angeles. The fact
that she had tickets to another city could explain why she did
not pick up any luggage at baggage claim. Indeed, one of the
agents later admitted that he only found her failure to pick up
luggage suspicious before he learned that she was changing
planes.171
I give these explanations simply to highlight that the officers’ interpretation of her behavior as suspicious was not the
164. Id. at 547, 558.
165. Id. at 547 n.1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 547.
168. Id. at 547 n.1.
169. Id. at 564 (Powell, J., concurring). The DEA agent heard the ticket
agent tell Mendenhall that “her ticket to Pittsburgh already was in order and
that all she needed was a boarding pass for the flight.” Id. at 573 (White, J.,
dissenting).
170. Id. at 572.
171. Id. at 573 n.9.
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only plausible one. Certainly, the conditional probability that
Mendenhall was engaged in criminal behavior is greater when
her actions are considered cumulatively. However, even when
viewed as a whole, Mendenhall’s behavior was also consistent
with innocence.
While neither agent mentioned the fact that Mendenhall
was black,172 her race is relevant. The automatic activation of
negative racial meanings upon seeing Mendenhall could have
affected the agents’ interpretation of her behavior. Of course,
the agents could have been engaged in conscious racial profiling. However, implicit bias also could explain their behavior. In
fact, conscious racial profiling would only exacerbate the operation of implicit biases.
The operation of implicit biases also can explain the “‘chameleon-like way [that drug courier profiles have] of adapting to
any particular set of observations.’”173 Former Supreme Court
Justice Thurgood Marshall gave examples of inconsistent explanations given by law enforcement officers as conduct fitting
the drug courier profile. He noted that in different cases, officers testified that a suspect was suspicious because he was the
first to get off the plane, the last to get off, or because he got off
in the middle.174 The science of implicit bias provides an explanation for these inconsistent accounts that does not require the
assumption that the officers engaged in intentional and deceitful after-the-fact explanations. Rather, the operation of implicit
bias can cause individuals to evaluate behaviors differently depending upon the race of the individual under scrutiny. What
may seem suspicious in one instance may not seem so in another simply depending upon whether racial stereotypes are nonconsciously activated.175 Since officers constantly are on the
lookout for criminal activity, they likely are steeped in non172. See id. at 558 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that Mendenhall was black).
173. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987)).
174. Id.; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 47–51 (1999).
175. Commentators and Supreme Court Justices alike have expressed
skepticism about the seeming malleability of drug courier profiles. See, e.g.,
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting); COLE, supra note 176, at
47–51. Drug courier profiles were created originally by the Drug Enforcement
Agency for use at airports. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 233–34 (1983). These profiles often contain
race as a relevant factor. Id. at 234. Their use has expanded to highways. Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and
Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 854 (1985).
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conscious black stereotypes that influence their judgments and
behaviors.
b. Urban Environments
Second, police often view blacks in environments that are
urban and poor. Officers and courts typically describe these
areas as “high crime” neighborhoods without empirical proof
that they are actually high in crime.176 Research confirms that
perceptions of disorder increase when a community is majority
black instead of majority white, even when the neighborhoods
are otherwise similarly situated.177
Encountering blacks in stereotypical urban and poor environments increases implicit biases by activating racial stereotypes.178 In fact, researchers have found that officers working
in urban environments exhibit higher levels of implicit bias
than those who do not.179 Thus, an officer patrolling a poor, urban, majority-black neighborhood is more prone to judge ambiguous behaviors as suspicious, causing him to stop more individuals who are innocent. Judges may assume that—all things
being equal—the police will be equally suspicious of a white individual in a white, urban, poor neighborhood as a black individual in a black, urban, poor neighborhood. However, the social-science evidence demonstrates that this is not necessarily
so.180
In sum, officers’ experiences do not necessarily make them
better able to distinguish guilty from innocent conduct. The nature of their jobs requires them to think constantly about crime
and they often encounter blacks in stereotypical environments.
176. See, e.g., Harris, Factors, supra note 135, at 672 n.134 (noting that police often attempt to justify their reasonable suspicion explanation by relying
upon the moniker high-crime neighborhood); Johnson, supra note 175, at 255
(arguing that courts can become complicit with officer prejudices and stereotypes when they unquestioningly accept police conclusions that an area is high
crime); Katz, supra note 113, at 500 (noting that the phrase “high crime
neighborhood” is often a proxy for race).
177. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (concluding that race plays a stronger role
in perception of disorder than does actual observations of disorder).
178. Jamie Barden et al., Contextual Moderation of Racial Bias: The Impact
of Social Roles on Controlled and Automatically Activated Attitudes, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 21 (2004) (noting that the effect of viewing
stereotyped individuals in certain settings increases implicit bias).
179. Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1015.
180. Thompson, supra note 115, at 959 n.5.
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Consequently, officers may be more likely to be influenced by
the operation of implicit biases than civilians, which may cause
officers to incorrectly interpret ambiguous behavior as suspicious when engaged in by blacks as opposed to whites. For this
reason, the Court’s assumption that officers are better than civilians at distinguishing guilty from innocent conduct may not
withstand scientific scrutiny when race is involved.
3. Race Salience
Since Terry, the Supreme Court has established that race
can be relevant to determining if a reasonable suspicion of criminality exists so long as it is not the sole factor.181 Not surprisingly then, police officers sometimes rely upon race to justify
Terry seizures. In United States v. Weaver,182 for example, an
officer indicated that he became suspicious of Mr. Weaver in
part because Weaver was a “roughly dressed young Black
male.” While acknowledging that “large groups of our citizens
should not be regarded by law enforcement officers as presumptively criminal based upon their race,” the Eighth Circuit approved the officer’s reliance on race:
[F] acts are not to be ignored simply because they may be unpleasant—and the unpleasant fact in this case is that . . . race, when
coupled with the other factors Hicks relied upon, was a factor in the
decision to approach and ultimately detain Weaver. We wish it were
otherwise, but we take the facts as they are presented to us, not as we
would like them to be.183

181. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1975)
(holding that referrals based largely on ancestry to secondary inspection areas
at traffic checkpoints are permissible); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 885–87 (1974) (noting that ancestry is a relevant factor when combined with others, but not standing alone); see also Banks, supra note 11, at
1086–87 n.47 (acknowledging this view); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,
101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 733 (2003) (same); David A. Harris, Using Race or
Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment
Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 428–35 (2003)
(same). But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where particularized or individualized suspicion is required. Moreover, we conclude, for the
reasons we have indicated, that it is also not an appropriate factor.”).
182. United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 394 n.2. Other factors the officer relied upon were his “own experience and . . . intelligence reports he had received from the Los Angeles authorities that young male members of Black Los Angeles gangs were flooding the
Kansas City area with cocaine.” Id. In his dissent, Judge Arnold noted the lack
of empirical evidence to support the agent’s claim that drug courier passengers
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Other courts have similarly affirmed the use of race to establish criminal suspicion.184
When courts allow officers to utilize race to overcome
shortcomings in demonstrating reasonable suspicion, they assume that officers accurately remember their experiences and
make sound correlations between race and criminality. The
empirical evidence on memories and illusory correlations
should lead courts to be more cautious.185
Stereotypes about black criminality can affect memories
about contacts with blacks. This can occur because people are
more likely to encode events into memory that are consistent
with their preexisting beliefs and expectations.186 As stated by
noted social psychologist Ziva Kunda, “[m]uch of what we
‘learn’ from experience may reflect our prior theories about reexhibit a degree of nervousness more pronounced than innocent airline passengers and that young black males from Los Angeles were more prone to be
drug couriers than young white males. Id. at 397 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Meza-Meza, No. 99-10198, 2000 WL 286284,
at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2000) (providing that “race can be one factor considered in establishing reasonable suspicion under all of the circumstances” (citation omitted)); United States v. Moss, No. 99-6510, 2000 WL 33121240, at *2–
3 & n.1. (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2000) (same); United States v. Travis, 837 F. Supp.
1386, 1391 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (“[T]he agents are of the belief that only a minute
percentage of the air traveling public are couriers and that focusing on minorities from the Los Angeles flights is an effective use of law enforcement resources as indicated by the number of successful prosecutions.”). Courts also
allow consideration of race when they permit officers to rely on drug courier
profiles. These profiles often contain race as a relevant factor. Angela J. Davis,
Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 430 (1997); Johnson,
supra note 175, at 234. Although courts do not always countenance the use of
race by police officers to establish criminality, these cases demonstrate that
officers do consider race in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists.
See, e.g., United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990); State v.
Graciano, 653 P.2d 683 (Ariz. 1982).
185. There is one study that supports the idea that more experienced officers may rely less on stereotypes in their judgments. See B. Michelle Peruche
& E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law Enforcement Officers’ Automatic and
Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 198 (2006). In this study, “there was a marginally significant effect of years on the force in predicting the degree of racial bias on the
shooting simulation. More years in the law enforcement profession was related
to less racial bias on the early trials . . . .” Id.
186. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory
Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 343–44 (1979); see also Claudia E. Cohen, Person Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects
of Prior Knowledge, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 444 –48 (1981)
(describing a study in which subjects were more likely to remember stereotype-consistent information).
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ality rather than the actual nature of reality.”187 Because of
both implicit and conscious biases, officers are likely to have
better memories of individuals who confirm their suspicions of
criminality than for those who do not.188
One study has demonstrated that implicit stereotypes can
affect the memory of police officers. In this study, implicit stereotypes caused officers to unintentionally misidentify individuals with more stereotypically black features as people they had
seen before.189 The same significant effects were not demonstrated when officers were asked to identify white individuals.190 In fact, the officers misremembered black individuals despite the fact that they paid more attention to the black faces
than to the white faces.191
Flawed memories can cause officers to see correlations between blacks and crime that do not exist and to miss correlations between behavior and crime that actually do exist.192
These illusory correlations193 between race and criminality can
“persist even in the face of data in which these correlations are
nonexistent.”194 This can explain why officers continue to stop
187. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 130 (1999); see also Jonathan A. Fugelsang
& Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for Understanding
Causal Reasoning and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
LONDON 1749, 1751 (2004), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC1693458/pdf/15590615.pdf (“Several studies have found that individuals appear to have great difficulty evaluating evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs . . . . The typical finding is that people are more likely to
attend to, seek out and evaluate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs
and ignore or downplay evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs.” (citations omitted)). Remarkably, cognitive neuroscientists have found that different brain structures are involved in evaluating evidence that is consistent
with prior expectations versus evidence that is inconsistent. KUNDA, supra
note 29, at 130.
188. See Charles M. Judd & Bernadette Park, Definition and Assessment of
Accuracy in Social Stereotypes, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 112 (1993) (noting that
people remember more information about others that confirms their stereotypes
than information that is either irrelevant or disconfirms their preconceptions).
189. Eberhardt et al., supra note 42, at 877, 887–88.
190. See id. (noting that these difficulties were most acute when officers
perceived pictures of black people).
191. Id. at 886–97.
192. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 127.
193. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1195 (1995) (defining an “illusory correlation” as “the report by observers of a correlation between two classes of events which, in reality, (a) are
not correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are
correlated in the opposite direction from that which is reported” (citation
omitted)).
194. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 128.
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blacks at higher rates than whites despite the fact that hit
rates demonstrate that the practice is flawed. Officers simply
do not accurately remember their failed searches. This can occur because people unintentionally search their memories for
evidence that confirms an existing hypothesis rather than engaging in a balanced search for evidence that either confirms or
refutes it.195
In fact, encountering counterstereotypical individuals—
that is, blacks who are not involved in criminal activity—may
actually result in strengthening stereotypes through a process
known as subtyping: “[b]y allocating counterstereotypic individuals . . . to a subtype that is considered atypical and unrepresentative of the group as a whole, one may be able to maintain one’s global stereotype of the group even though one knows
that some group members do not fit the bill.”196 Indeed, the
more a counterstereotypical person deviates from the stereotype, the easier it is to subtype that individual.197 Thus, officers’ correlations between race and criminality may say more
about their preexisting stereotypes than about the accuracy of
their beliefs.
This section reveals that the failure to be realistic about
police decisionmaking and judgment has pernicious effects on
policing and privacy. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is primarily concerned with prohibiting arbitrary invasions of privacy by the government.198 In constructing the doctrine to protect
195. See id. at 128 (describing experiments highlighting this phenomena).
For a general discussion, see Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL.
REV. 211 (1987).
196. KUNDA, supra note 29, at 384.
197. Id. at 390 (“[T]he more inaccurate our stereotype of a group, the less
likely it is to change spontaneously following encounters with group members.
This is because the more inaccurate our stereotype, the more discrepant it will
be from the typical group member. Put differently, the typical group member
will deviate more extremely from more inaccurate stereotypes, and so will be
dismissed more readily as an exception.”).
198. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of
this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 (1974) (“A paramount purpose of the [F]ourth [A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches
and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures.”); Tracey Maclin,
The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197,
201 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] (“[T]he central meaning of
the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.”); David A.
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against arbitrary invasions, the Court made inaccurate behavioral assumptions about police behavior that actually undermines this core value. This leads to policing that fails to protect
equally the privacy rights of all individuals regardless of their
race.
To realize the normative goal of the Fourth Amendment,
courts should take accurate understandings of decisionmaking
into account rather than basing their legal standards on assumptions that are empirically unsupportable.199 In the next
section, I explore how the doctrine might look if courts replaced
their flawed behavioral assumptions with accurate accounts of
human behavior. These tentative suggestions will be developed
in a future article.
C. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON DOCTRINAL REFORMS
“[T]he ‘touchstone’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘is reasonableness.’”200 As Professor Maclin observes, “reasonableness is a
malleable concept.”201 It is judged by taking into account the
“totality of the circumstances.”202 The Court has considered a
wide variety of circumstances under the rubric of reasonableness:
[T]he text of the amendment; history; threats to police safety; the use
of standardized police procedures; subjective and objective expectations of privacy; the presence of police coercion; the fact that privacy
interests are only marginally protected; the potential danger to the
public at large; the severity of the alleged criminal conduct a suspect
has committed; whether a suspect poses a threat to the community or
actively resists an officer’s seizure; and a whole host of other factors
depending on the circumstances.203

Surely, considering how implicit biases can cause arbitrary
invasions of privacy is an appropriate consideration under the
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 286.
199. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 1, at 1016–17 (discussing the use of behavioral theories to shape legal incentives).
200. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
201. Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 371.
202. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997); Robinette, 519 U.S. at
39; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996).
203. Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 370–71. Professor Maclin argues that
consideration of racial impact should be added to this list. Id. at 371; see also
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35 (rejecting “any ‘litmus-paper test’ or single ‘sentence
or . . . paragraph . . . rule,’ in recognition of the ‘endless variations in the facts
and circumstances’ implicating the Fourth Amendment” (citations omitted)).
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category of reasonableness. While I am not the first to suggest
that reasonableness should include consideration of racial effects,204 I am the first to suggest that the reasonableness inquiry should include consideration of the behavioral effects of
implicit social cognitions. Importantly, I am not arguing that
courts should conduct an inquiry into the subjective intentions
of individual officers. Such inquiry is unhelpful because officers
will be unaware of the effects of nonconscious biases on their
behavior. Since, as is discussed more fully in Part III, implicit
biases are malleable, police departments and legal doctrine can
create a situation that reduces the effects of implicit biases on
behavior.
The Court often determines the reasonableness of a police
action by balancing the government’s interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual’s interest in privacy and security.205 When the effects of implicit social cognitions on behavior are considered, it is apparent that allowing officers to act on
their interpretations of ambiguous behavior and to rely on
memories of their experiences to justify encroachments on privacy is unreasonable. First, these actions do not serve the government’s interest in effective law enforcement. As the data on
hit rates206 demonstrate, police waste resources subjecting
204. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 808 (1994) (“Even if racially disparate impact alone does
not violate the Constitution, surely equal protection principles call for concern
when Blacks bear the brunt of a government search or seizure policy. Thus, in
a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially
imbalanced effects and ask ourselves whether they are truly reasonable.”);
Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 371 (arguing that reasonableness should include consideration of racial impact); Sklansky, supra note 198, at 329 (“What
is most troubling about the recent vehicle stop decisions are ‘all the circumstances’—including the continuing and destructive role of race in American
policing, the injuries other than forced disclosures suffered at roadside detentions, and the shortcomings of direct restrictions on police abuse and generalized guarantees of equality—that the Supreme Court overlooked.”).
205. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“‘[T]he key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness—the balancing of competing interests.’” (citation omitted)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement
practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”); see also Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 198, at 198–99 (“[T]he central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ . . . Whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable is generally determined by balancing
the competing interests at stake—the government’s interest in effective law enforcement versus the individual’s interest in privacy and personal security.”).
206. See supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text for a discussion of hit rates.
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countless innocent blacks to humiliating stops and frisks207
while failing to stop many whites who are engaged in criminal
activity.
Second, these actions hurt law enforcement interests by
fostering mistrust. Many within black communities perceive
the constant stopping, questioning, and searching of innocent
individuals as harassment, which results in distrust, anger,
and other feelings not conducive to fostering good communitypolice relationships or perceptions of legitimacy in the criminal
justice system.208 Growing numbers of individuals in these
communities already view the police “as just another gang.”209
Attitudes towards the police “begin crystallizing during adolescence when youths have greater opportunities for direct and
indirect contact with officers and other agents of the juvenile
justice system. By early adulthood, most people’s views of the
police are fairly well developed, including their perceptions of
officers’ trustworthiness.”210 Lack of trust in the police and in
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system can result in
communities being less safe.211 Researchers have found that
when citizens distrust the police, not only are they hesitant to
report crimes and to help with police investigations, but police
officers are also more at risk of verbal abuse and physical confrontations.212
The implications for police-citizen trust are particularly
disturbing based on recent evidence that distrust of the police
can result vicariously. A recent study found that amongst
blacks, learning about negative police encounters of other
207. E.g., Thompson, supra note 115, at 959 & n.5 (citing evidence of police
conducting tens of thousands of fruitless stops and frisks, mostly against
blacks and Latinos); see supra notes 9–19 and accompanying text.
208. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J.
835, 843 (2008) (noting the Clinton Administration’s recognition of this perception); Harcourt, supra note 10, at 1329–30 (noting the deleterious effect of
disproportionate police contact on minority communities); Alexandra Natapoff,
Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
645, 646 (2004) (noting these problems and their effect on predominantly
black, low-income communities); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy
and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 237 (2008) (noting that minorities have
low levels of trust and confidence in the police). See generally PAUL BUTLER,
LET’S GET FREE (2009).
209. David K. Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997,
at A33, available at 1997 WLNR 4891728.
210. Flexon et al., supra note 27, at 181 (citations omitted).
211. Capers, supra note 208, at 800; Natapoff, supra note 208, at 687–90.
212. Flexon et al., supra note 27, at 180 (citations omitted).
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blacks was significantly related to their attitudes.213 In fact, for
high-school-aged students, one of the greatest determinants of
trust in the police was “observ[ing] other students stopped and
treated with disrespect by the police.”214 Thus, policing affected
by implicit biases does not serve law enforcement interests.
Even if it did, the interests such policing serve are negligible
compared to the violations caused to the dignity, privacy, and
autonomy interests of individuals, particularly nonwhites.215
The current Terry doctrine facilitates unreasonable police
actions because it fails to account for the operation of implicit
biases on behavior. Consideration of these biases should lead
courts to question whether the reasonable suspicion test is up
to the task of preventing intrusions on individual liberty based
upon nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.
The following section suggests some tentative proposals for
Terry reform that will serve both law enforcement and privacy
interests by taking the empirical evidence about human behavior and decisionmaking seriously. Importantly, these suggestions are not concrete proposals, but rather some preliminary
thoughts for future reflection. I hope to begin a conversation
about how tinkering with Fourth Amendment doctrine may
provide a mechanism for reducing the effects of implicit bias on
police behavior.
1. Return to Probable Cause
The reasonable suspicion test fails to prevent the police
from acting on racial hunches. By allowing officers to act on
their interpretation of ambiguous behavior, the test underprotects the privacy rights of nonwhites; they will be stopped and
frisked more often than similarly situated whites, not because
they are acting more suspiciously, but because implicit biases
likely will affect how police interpret and react to their behavior.
One solution is to return to the probable cause standard as
the sole justification for stops and frisks. Probable cause is a
tougher standard than reasonable suspicion. As Professor Sheri
Lynn Johnson writes, “[t]he former reaches only completed or
ongoing crimes, while the latter encompasses imminent crimi213. Id. at 182.
214. Id. at 187.
215. For a powerful discussion of dignitary harms and the Fourth Amendment, see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257 (2002).
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nal activity. Probable cause also demands greater confidence in
the interpretation of the facts observed.”216
The probable cause standard would require officers to
gather more information and to observe more unambiguous behavior before seizing individuals. The science demonstrates
that individuation (i.e., compiling more information about an
individual) can reduce the effects of implicit cognitions on behavior.217 Reducing the effects of implicit bias may result in
stops and searches that are more accurate.
Data from the Maryland State Police provide some evidence that requiring officers to have probable cause before acting increases accuracy. The data demonstrate that when officers conducted searches based upon probable cause, their hit
rates were fifty-three percent. However, when officers asked
individuals for consent to conduct a search, likely because they
did not have probable cause, their hit rates dropped to twentytwo percent.218
Other commentators have suggested a return to probable
cause.219 In doing so, they recognized, as I do, that it is unlikely
that courts would actually implement it. An additional problem
is that even if implemented, courts might dilute the probable
cause standard to such an extent that it would operate much as
the reasonable suspicion test currently does.220 A further problem with this approach is that the probable cause standard is
216. Johnson, supra note 175, at 216.
217. See, e.g., Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at 72 (noting that people can
avoid stereotyping by engaging in individuation—the gathering of more information); Margo J. Monteith et al., Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 72 (1998) (describing individuation as “actively seeking out individuating information about a person and
forming impressions of the person based on this information”). See generally
Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care? The
Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 145 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1549898 (discussing
the importance of individualized suspicion). For an inventive rethinking of the
probable cause standard that might prevent its dilution, see Max Minzner,
Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913 (2009).
218. Gross & Barnes, supra note 181, at 692.
219. See, e.g., Harris, Frisking, supra note 135, at 3–6 (noting the hardships that stops and frisks supported by less than probable cause place on certain groups); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1332–33 (1990)
(opining that the reasonable suspicion standard no longer has a place in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
220. Maclin, supra note 219, at 1331–32 (noting that this has already happened once).
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not necessarily immune from the effects of implicit bias. Although it is theoretically more difficult to meet than the reasonable suspicion standard, the probable cause standard is
“non-technical,” “fluid,” and based upon “common-sense.”221
Consequently, the standard still requires officers to evaluate
ambiguous behavior unless they catch an individual redhanded.
2. No Automatic Deference
Currently, courts defer to officer judgments of criminality
in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists222 without requiring empirical evidence supporting the officer’s ability
to make sound conclusions or the reliability of the evidence the
officer used to make his judgment. For instance, in United
States v. Sokolow, law enforcement agents relied in part upon a
drug courier profile to justify a Terry seizure.223 The Ninth Circuit “essentially rejected the use of inferences based on common
sense and the shared experience of agents in the field.”224 It
held that, absent empirical proof of the profile’s reliability, the
evidence was insufficient to justify a seizure.225

221. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983).
222. In fact, the Court shows deference even when those inferences are not
based upon any actual experience of the officer. For instance, in Terry, the
Court deferred to Officer McFadden’s conclusion that Terry and Chilton were
about to commit a robbery despite the fact that the officer admitted having no
experience observing individuals casing a joint. Suppression Hearing, supra
note 111, at 1420.
The Court similarly defers to officer experience, without requiring proof of
actual experience, when probable cause is at issue. In Ornelas v. United
States, the Court “recognized that a police officer may draw inferences based
on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.” 517 U.S.
690, 700 (1996) (citation omitted). In that case, the Court noted that facts
which “may suggest only wear and tear” to a layman, “to Officer Luedke, who
had searched roughly 2,000 cars for narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be
secreted inside the panel. An appeals court should give due weight to a trial
court’s finding that the officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.”
Id. The problem here is that although the officer searched 2000 cars in the
past, there is no evidence of his rate of success. Other commentators similarly
have questioned the Court’s reliance on officer expertise. See, e.g., Maclin,
Legacy, supra note 121, at 1306–07. My proposal builds from Maclin’s critique
by adding the lessons from implicit social cognition to provide an empirical basis for questioning this reliance.
223. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987).
224. Brief for the United States at 35, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1
(1989) (No. 87-1295).
225. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1421.
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The Supreme Court did not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead.
It agreed with the government that empirical proof was unnecessary.226 In doing so, it cited United States v. Cortez for the
proposition that reasonable suspicion “does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated
certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are
law enforcement officers.”227
The Court ruled without the benefit of scientific knowledge
and empirical evidence on human decisionmaking and judgment. What the science demonstrates is that an officer’s common-sense conclusions about behavior are often wrong or, at
the very least, may be nonconsciously influenced by the race of
the person being observed.228 By deferring to an officer’s common-sense judgments, the Court assumes that officers’ memories of their experiences are pristine and accurate. However,
the science refutes this assumption.229 Thus, by blindly deferring, the Court may underprotect the liberty of nonwhites and
facilitate potentially inefficient policing.
In order to reduce the effects of implicit bias on policing,
courts should not defer automatically to officer judgments of
criminality in determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists. At the very least, courts should require officers to provide
empirical support for their inferences before giving those inferences any weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus.230 This
empirical support should be in the form of the individual officer’s hit rates. The officer should provide specific information
that out of X number of seizures based upon criteria Y, this officer’s percentage of productive stops and frisks is Z. Providing
this evidence avoids the problem of relying upon the accuracy of
an officer’s memories of his experiences.231
226. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8.
227. Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. Id.
230. Requiring empirical proof should not be controversial. The Court already requires plaintiffs in selective enforcement claims to provide empirical
proof that similarly situated individuals were treated differently. United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996); see also United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring the plaintiff in a selective
enforcement claim to demonstrate that DEA agents failed to stop whites who
“look[ed] nervously over their shoulders—but chose not to approach them”).
231. In fact, scholars have noted that “few profiles have empirical support,
and most leave police with unfettered discretion while creating the false im-
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However, aggregate hit rates alone should be insufficient
to justify a Terry stop because this would undermine the notion
of individualized suspicion that is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment.232 For instance, even if an officer demonstrated a
hit rate of thirty percent for finding contraband when he
stopped young white men, with close cropped hair, wearing
baggy pants, and who live in high-income areas, this information alone should not entitle officers to stop all young white
men who meet this description with impunity. Rather, additional evidence to support the officer’s inference that the particular individual stopped is likely engaged in criminal activity
should be required. Thus, aggregate hit-rate data alone should
not be a sufficient basis for finding a stop and frisk reasonable.
The important point here is that courts should not defer to
officer judgments about when an individual’s actions denote
criminality in the absence of any evidence of the particular officer’s reliability for making these judgments. When courts determine whether a reasonable suspicion exists, they should
base their judgments, in part, on some form of empirically validated evidence rather than relying upon an officer’s personal
experiences or common-sense conclusions, which the science
demonstrates are often incorrect.233 Since unproductive stops
will affect an officer’s aggregate hit rates, requiring officers to
provide empirical evidence will likely create incentives for them
to think carefully about the criteria they use before conducting
Terry stops.234 To the extent that this motivates officers to individuate, it will decrease the effects of implicit bias on police behavior.
pression of the opposite.” Taslitz, supra note 217, at 33 n.172 (citations omitted). For a more complete discussion of this proposal, see L. Song Richardson,
Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
232. See Christopher Slogobin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 82–84 (1991) (noting and responding to this critique). But
see Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment 75–76 (John M. Loin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 530, 2010),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1665562 (arguing that the phrase
“individualized suspicion” should be abandoned because it is inaccurate). See
generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A
HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) (examining the importance of individualized justice in the history of the Fourth Amendment).
233. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text; see also TASLITZ, supra note 232, at 261 (“Nothing in antebellum and Reconstruction history lessens the central need for the state to justify intrusions on citizens’ privacy,
property, and free movement absent a high quantity and quality of evidence of
criminal wrongdoing.”).
234. For a similar point, see Taslitz, supra note 217, at 38–39 n.184.
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3. No Reliance on Race or Race Proxies
Some courts currently allow officers to rely on race and
proxies for race (such as consideration of high-crime neighborhoods) to justify Terry seizures.235 Courts assume that these
considerations help officers ferret out criminal behavior. Without consideration of the science, some judges might believe that
using race and race proxies to infer criminality would more often than not result in accurate judgments of criminality. However, the science demonstrates that consideration of race and
race proxies may make officers less, not more, accurate.
By countenancing consideration of race to infer criminality,
courts exacerbate implicit biases by solidifying the association
between race and crime.236 First, purposefully focusing officer
attention on blacks and their criminal stereotype makes negative stereotypes salient and thus more available for use in judging behavior. This predisposes officers to interpret ambiguous
behaviors as more suspicious than they might otherwise.237
While solidifying the association between race and crime
occurs even when race is not consciously highlighted,238 focusing attention on the race-crime association exacerbates it.239
Thus, race salience encourages police encounters with blacks. It
draws police attention to blacks with the assumption that they
are involved in criminal activity. The nonconscious activation of
negative racial stereotypes, then, may cause officers to interpret ambiguous behavior as suspicious.
Second, when approaching the individual to dispel or confirm their suspicions, implicit biases may cause officers to nonconsciously behave with aggression. This will trigger a similar
response, solidifying the stereotype of blacks as aggressive. Officers may then interpret the aggressive behavior (that they
unknowingly initiated) as indicating that the individual is
armed and dangerous, resulting in an invasive, public, and
humiliating frisk.240 If the officer then finds evidence of crimi235. See Harris, Factors, supra note 135, at 671–81 (discussing lower
courts’ deference to police officers).
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. See Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 9862586.
238. See supra Part I.
239. See infra Part III.
240. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (“[I]t is simply fantastic to
urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ It
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great
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nal activity, this confirms the stereotype and becomes a more
memorable event than the occasions when he does not.
Third, by making race salient, the doctrine encourages officers to approach black individuals with the expectation of
finding evidence of criminal activity. Conscious affirmation and
practice of racial stereotypes facilitates the creation of automatic and nonconscious associations.241 The automatic activation of
negative stereotypes then has behavioral effects, leading to increased scrutiny, negative evaluations of ambiguous behaviors,
and negative treatment.242 Thus, conscious consideration of
race can exacerbate the behavioral effects of implicit bias, negatively affecting nonwhites.
In order to protect individuals from the arbitrary policing
caused by the operation of implicit bias, courts should decouple
the association between race and crime. Courts can accomplish
this by refusing to consider race and proxies for race in deciding
whether the police acted reasonably in conducting a stop and
frisk.243 In fact, courts should go further and clearly state that
race is irrelevant to a determination of whether a Terry seizure
is justified. By making this change, the doctrine can play an
important normative role, potentially influencing an officer’s
indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly.” (citations omitted)).
241. Devine, supra note 64, at 6 (“Automatic processes involve the unintentional or spontaneous activation of some well-learned set of associations or responses that have been developed through repeated activation in memory.”
(emphasis added)); see also John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effect of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 231 (1996) (“Preconscious activation of
mental representations develops from their frequent and consistent activation
in the presence of a given stimulus event in the environment.”). See generally
Richard M. Shiffrin & Walter Schneider, Controlled and Automatic Human
Information Processing: II. Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a
General Theory, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 185 (1977) (describing the learning of
automatic attending).
242. See supra Part I.
243. I am not dealing here with the situation in which a person of a particular race is identified as a criminal perpetrator. See, e.g., Banks, supra note
11, at 1081–82; Johnson, supra note 175, at 225–30. Furthermore, I am not
arguing for a form of colorblindness. For insightful discussions detailing how
colorblindness is not a form of race neutrality, but rather a form of racial burdening, see Carbado, supra note 135, at 975, and Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
“Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991). Interestingly,
psychological experiments also support the view that advocating a colorblind
perspective increases racial biases. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Controlling Prejudice and Stereotyping, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING,
AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 111, 126–27 (citing studies).
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beliefs about appropriate uses of race in policing.244 At the very
least, if the refusal to consider race and race proxies makes it
more difficult for officers to establish reasonable suspicion, officers will likely be more accurate in the stops they conduct.
Courts might even consider scrutinizing stops and frisks more
closely when the individual involved is a member of a racial
minority in order to counteract the likely effects of implicit bias
on the officer’s decision to conduct a seizure.245
4. Rethinking the Exclusionary Rule
A final and perhaps more controversial solution that is to
be taken up in a future article is to reconsider the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule.246 Currently, only defendants
in criminal cases have access to the exclusionary remedy. To
the extent that allegedly guilty blacks are disproportionately
represented amongst those seeking exclusion of evidence, the
exclusionary remedy may have the perverse effect of exacerbating implicit biases by solidifying the coupling of race and criminality.247 Perhaps rethinking the exclusionary rule in order to
reduce its potential effects on implicit biases is necessary, most
importantly by considering ways to make innocent victims of
Fourth Amendment violations more salient.
In conclusion, existing Fourth Amendment doctrine exacerbates the effects of implicit bias on policing by failing to
take into account empirical evidence of human behavior and
decisionmaking. Being sensitive to the behavioral effects of implicit bias will better protect all citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The tentative proposals suggested here
may help propel courts along that path and prevent arbitrary
invasions of privacy by reducing the effects of implicit bias and
correcting for them.
However, reducing the behavioral effects of the automatic
association between race and crime in proactive policing will
take more than doctrinal fixes. As others have noted, the law
244. See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law,
79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) (discussing how “law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society”).
245. See generally Taslitz, supra note 217, at 259 (noting that based upon
the history of the Fourth Amendment, “[a]ny use of race to establish suspicion
of crime should be judged skeptically and require strong justification”).
246. The exclusionary rule, in certain situations, bars the use of evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Herring v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 695, 700–04 (2009) (considering when the exclusionary rule applies).
247. See supra discussion Part I.
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alone may not be the most effective way to address nonconscious biases.248 Furthermore, the association between blacks
and criminality is so entrenched in our society that it would be
naïve to assume that mere doctrinal changes would be sufficient to break it.249 For this reason, Part III concentrates on
structural changes within the institution of the police for reducing the effects of implicit bias on their behavior.
III. STRUCTURAL REFORMS
Police departments likely have practices and internal
structures in place that promote arbitrary policing by unintentionally strengthening implicit biases. However, since implicit
biases are malleable, police departments may be able to implement strategies to moderate their effects. This Part offers suggestions for structural reforms to reduce the effects of implicit
biases on police behavior and joins the call for more empirical
work testing directly the behavioral effects of implicit bias on
legal decisionmaking.250 One significant challenge is that officers function in precisely the type of environment that encourages and facilitates nonconscious processing; they often must
make decisions quickly and in situations that are ambiguous,
potentially dangerous, and where a possible suspect’s appearance, demeanor, and neighborhood are the primary sources of
information.251
248. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1899–900 (advocating “caution[ ]
against approaches to unconscious discrimination—whatever its prevalence
and whatever the inadequacies of existing law—that rely principally on
stronger legal coercion as the primary tool to fight implicit discrimination”);
see also Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1080 (“[W]e need a new model of discrimination for implicit bias . . . . This new model must promote proactive
structural interventions that minimize harm without relying solely on potential individual litigation.”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001).
249. In fact, some even suggest that legal coercion may be counterproductive. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 26, at 1900 (“[C]oercion . . . can have a negative effect on people’s internalization of nondiscrimination norms.”).
250. See, e.g., Levinson et al., supra note 26, at 390. In his ingenious study,
Professor Levinson created a Guilty/Not Guilty IAT to determine whether implicit biases against blacks affect juror decisions of culpability. Perhaps an IAT
test to determine whether implicit biases affect police officer decisionmaking
related to suspicious behavior could also be devised.
251. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 364 –67 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1998) (describing rapid and automatic categorization); see also Barden
et al., supra note 178, at 19–21 (noting the effect of viewing stereotyped individuals in certain settings increases implicit bias); Mark Schaller et al., Fear
of the Dark: Interactive Effects of Beliefs About Danger and Ambient Darkness
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A. REVIEW OF EXISTING PRACTICES
Police departments should identify practices and procedures that have the potential to exacerbate implicit biases and
then consider whether they can and should be changed. In
some instances, safety concerns may counsel against elimination of an existing procedure even though it has the potential to
strengthen implicit biases. In other instances, the need for
change will be obvious and modification easy.
One easily implemented change is to eliminate the use of
training videos that portray racial minorities as perpetrators.252 This type of video likely strengthens implicit biases by
reinforcing the race-criminal stereotype. Likewise, training simulations and similar practices should be conducted in ways that
do not bolster racial stereotypes.
Departments also should reconsider the techniques they
employ to reduce racial profiling.253 Studies demonstrate that
making race salient increases activation of implicit stereotypes,
even when individuals are instructed to avoid using racial stereotypes in their judgments. This phenomenon is known as the
“rebound effect” and demonstrates that attempts to suppress
thoughts can make those thoughts “become hyperaccessible
once people relax their efforts at suppression or become preoccupied with other tasks.”254 This rebound effect can explain
why consciously trying to avoid considerations of race can lead
to greater use of racial stereotypes.255
on Ethnic Stereotypes, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 637, 647
(2003) (noting that darkness increases the activation of danger stereotypes);
Taslitz, supra note 8, at 7–8.
252. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 105, at 48–49 (discussing training videos
that utilize minority surnames for perpetrators).
253. See Maclin, Race, supra note 125, at 385 n.223; see also State v. Soto,
734 A.2d 350, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (“[T]wo former troopers called
by the defense who were not reappointed at the end of their terms . . . said
they were trained and coached to make race based ‘profile’ stops to increase
their criminal arrests . . . .”); HARRIS, supra note 105, at 240 (describing New
Jersey police officers admitting to training to profile blacks and Hispanics);
Weatherspoon, supra note 135, at 453 (discussing an internal Maryland state
trooper memo encouraging officers to target blacks driving on I-68). Professor
David Harris identifies myriad ways in which officers, even when not explicitly
trained to consider race, are implicitly taught to do so through intelligence reports that feature race prominently. HARRIS, supra note 105, at 50.
254. Kunda & Sinclair, supra note 31, at 20 (citation omitted).
255. Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 911 (1992); see
also Sei Jin Ko et al., Sneaking in Through the Back Door: How CategoryBased Stereotype Suppression Leads to Rebound in Feature-Based Effects, 44
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Thus, both training officers to consider race and instructing officers to avoid considerations of race can increase arbitrary policing by augmenting the effect of implicit biases on
judgment. For example, in one study, researchers informed
participants that race could affect their ability to determine
whether an object was a weapon or a tool.256 Researchers then
divided the subjects into three groups.257 One group was instructed to do its best to avoid using race in making judgments
about whether an object was a tool or a weapon.258 The second
group was told to use race in its efforts to distinguish a tool
from a weapon.259 The final group was given no instruction
about the use of race.260
In all three categories, individuals primed with an image of
a black face were more likely to mistake a tool for a weapon,
and individuals primed with a white face were more likely to
mistake a weapon for a tool.261 Counterintuitively, those participants told to avoid using stereotypes in their judgments were
unable to reduce the impact of race on their judgments.262 In
fact, the instruction to “avoid using race increased the extent to
which participants made more stereotype congruent versus incongruent errors.”263 In sum, the researchers concluded that
“making race salient increased the tendency to stereotypically
misidentify objects, regardless of whether race was focused on
with the intent to avoid its influence, or the intent to employ

J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 833, 833–34 (2008) (discussing how reduction in one type of stereotype can increase other stereotypes); C. Neil Macrae
et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 808–09 (1994) (considering whether
people can successfully suppress stereotypical thoughts); C. Neil Macrae et al.,
Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus and the Regulation of Mental
Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 578 (1998) (discussing the ability to self-regulate stereotypical thoughts). But see Margo J. Monteith et al.,
Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 70–72 (1998) (concluding that people with egalitarian values may be less susceptible to rebound effects).
256. B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility
Bias and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 388 (2002).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 390.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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it.”264 The researchers cautioned that their research investigated only the effects of temporary goals on implicit biases.
Hence, they noted that repeated practice dissociating race from
stereotypical traits might reduce the automatic association.265
An important reason to avoid training officers to consider
race in making judgments of criminality is its obvious effect of
increasing the association between race and crime. It also encourages officers to consciously categorize individuals by race,
which can increase automatic stereotype activation. For instance, in one study, researchers showed subjects photographs
of both white and black faces.266 Researchers gave three sets of
subjects different instructions to categorize the photographs.
One instruction encouraged racial categorization, while another
encouraged individuation by asking subjects to consider whether the individual pictured liked vegetables. The third did not
encourage categorization at all, but rather asked individuals to
determine whether a dot was present in the photograph. Researchers found that those subjects encouraged to engage in racial categorization showed implicit stereotype activation upon
viewing the photos of black faces.267 However, subjects instructed either to individuate or to engage in a task that did
not require categorization did not activate racial stereotypes.268
Thus, the science demonstrates that giving individuals a goal
that encourages individuation rather than racial categorization
may reduce activation of implicit stereotypes.

264. Id. at 391.
265. Id. at 395; see also Charles Stangor, The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Within Social Psychology: A Quick History of Theory
and Research, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at 1, 11 (citing studies demonstrating that conscious and
implicit stereotyping can be reduced with practice denying stereotypical beliefs and by designing legal remedies to reduce reliance on stereotypes); infra
Part III.B.2.
266. Wheeler & Fiske, supra note 44, at 57.
267. Id. at 62.
268. Id.; see also Fiske, supra note 251, at 358–60 (reviewing studies documenting that individuation reduces automatic stereotyping). Similarly, in
another study, researchers discovered that when individuals were asked to
decide whether a picture was an inanimate object or a woman, the subjects
automatically activated gender stereotypes. However, when asked to determine whether a white dot was present in the photos, automatic gender stereotypes were not activated. C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Activation of Social Stereotypes: The Moderating Role of Processing Objectives, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 471, 482 (1997). Researchers surmised that the first task made
gender salient, resulting in automatic stereotype activation.
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An additional reason to avoid connecting race with criminality is that encouraging the race-crime connection can create
a community that supports racial stereotyping. The motivation
to conform one’s beliefs to those of the ingroup affects implicit
stereotypes. In one study, individuals showed weaker automatic racial stereotype activation when they perceived a low degree
of consensus within their group for stereotypical beliefs and
vice versa.269
Another area of concern is police deployment patterns.
Black neighborhoods are simultaneously underpoliced and
overpoliced. They are underpoliced when it comes to the police
responding to calls reporting criminal activity.270 Yet, these
neighborhoods are overpoliced when it comes to proactive policing.271 Deploying officers to majority-black neighborhoods to
engage in proactive policing does not seem to affect police responsiveness to citizen complaints. Studies show that implicit
biases increase when individuals view blacks in contexts that
trigger negative stereotypes, such as in poor urban neighborhoods.272 Hence, departments should consider whether it is bet269. Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651 (2001).
270. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594 (2003) (“Drug enforcement efforts that
burden some racial minorities may also disproportionately benefit those racial
minorities whose neighborhoods are most plagued by drug dealing and its associated problems.”); see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW
19 (1997) (“[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to
criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws.”);
Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1775–76
(2006) (emphasizing the importance of recognizing the destructive implications of underenforcement).
271. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 174, at 44 (discussing the tendency toward
“quality of life policing” in high-crime areas which includes stop-and-frisk tactics, pretext stops, and arrests for minor infractions); see also Kenneth B.
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 391–412
(2002) (describing the disproportionate arrests and sentences of blacks during
the war on drugs).
272. See, e.g., Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context:
Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes, J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 815, 820 (2001) (noting that exposure to gang incidents increased
implicit biases); see also Barden et al., supra note 178, at 11 (explaining the
implicit bias that blacks are athletic but poor students); Laura A. Rudman &
Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent
and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133,
133 (2002) (finding that subjects exposed to violent rap music had increased
automatic associations to underlying racial stereotypes).
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ter to refrain from deploying officers to these neighborhoods
solely to engage in proactive policing when it both strengthens
implicit biases and does not significantly increase community
safety.273
B. DEBIASING STRATEGIES
This section suggests a number of specific debiasing strategies that may increase arrest efficiency by reducing or negating the effects of implicit biases. The suggestions are based
upon techniques that have shown promise in the research context.274 The proposals are divided into four general categories:
increasing awareness, training, hiring, and incentivizing positive interactions.

273. Of course, it will be important to determine, as an empirical matter,
whether the mere presence of the police reduces crime.
274. This section does not discuss all the studies that have implications for
debiasing the police. For instance, some studies demonstrate that motivation
can reduce stereotype activation. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond
Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) (showing people with high internal motivation were more nonprejudiced). These
findings suggest that changing incentive structures within police departments
may be an effective way to reduce implicit biases. Furthermore, people who
are committed to egalitarian goals may be able to control stereotype activation. See, e.g., Michael Johns et al., Internal Motivation to Respond Without
Prejudice and Automatic Egalitarian Goal Activation, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1514, 1518 (2008) (“Together, these studies provide converging
evidence that individuals who avoid prejudice because it is personally important to them, and not because of perceived social pressures, automatically activate egalitarian goals to help minimize expression of implicit race bias.”);
William W. Maddux et al., Saying No to Negativity: The Effects of Context and
Motivation to Control Prejudice on Automatic Evaluative Responses, 41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 19, 33 (2005) (those who are motivated to control prejudice reactions have automatized control strategies to avoid prejudice); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
167, 181–82 (1999) (activation of stereotypes can be controlled by egalitarian
goals); Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping:
Implicitly Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18
SOC. COGNITION 151, 171 (2000) (showing that exposure to a member of a stereotyped group leads the egalitarian goal construct to be implicitly activated in
some people); see also Leslie R.M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice on Implicit Prejudice: The
Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced Responses, 26 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 215, 222 (2004) (finding that those with internal motivations to
be nonprejudiced show decreased implicit biases compared to those who are
only externally motivated).
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1. Increasing Awareness
The possibility for moderating or overcoming implicit biases is at its highest when individuals are aware of the potential for bias and for controlling it.275 One way to increase officer
awareness is to teach both police recruits and current officers
about the results of research into the behavioral effects of implicit bias that may affect their interactions with citizens. For
example, they should be instructed about the studies that demonstrate that their evaluations of behavior may be affected by
implicit biases,276 and that these behavioral effects can have serious consequences such as causing them to shoot unarmed
black men more readily than unarmed white men.277 At the police academy, a class on the science of implicit bias could be
added to the curriculum. In police precincts, periodic classes
could be held that would be mandatory for officers assigned to
proactive patrols units.
Another way to increase awareness is to educate officers
about hit-rate data. Explaining that implicit biases, rather
than conscious racial animus, can account for the data may reduce defensiveness. Discussing the data can also facilitate a
frank discussion about officer beliefs that racial disparities in
seizures and frisks exist because of differential crime rates
amongst ethnic groups.278 The idea is not to force officers to

275. Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in
Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 346 (Shelly
Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Fiske, supra note 251, at 364; Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 171 (2008); Jost et al., supra note 5, at 56–
57; Lane et al., supra note 21, at 437; Leonard S. Newman & James S. Uleman, Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Spontaneous Trait Inference, 16
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 224, 236 (1990); Fritz Strack et al.,
Awareness of the Influence as a Determinant of Assimilation Versus Contrast,
23 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 59 (1993).
276. See supra Part I.
277. See supra Part I.
278. HARRIS, supra note 105 at 15, 73–74. Sometimes officers admit that
race is an important consideration in deciding who to stop and investigate.
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 581 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith,
J., dissenting) (noting the testimony of a DEA agent who stated that at least
seventy-five percent of the individuals stopped pursuant to the profile were
black); Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp. 698, 723 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting that
Drug Interdiction Unit officers focused on defendants because they were “two
Hispanic men . . . traveling in the company of a white woman”); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268–69 (1999) (quoting two police officers).
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take problack attitudes,279 but to point out that in the proactive
policing context, the hit-rate data demonstrate that their assumptions may be incorrect, and their preconceived notions
may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Professor David Harris
puts it nicely:
If a police officer assumes people of color are more likely to commit
crimes because he knows that African Americans and Latinos are
overrepresented among people arrested and imprisoned, and he therefore investigates people of color more frequently as a result, his
theory and preexisting beliefs will be confirmed. Of the drivers and
pedestrians he stops and searches, most will be black or brown. Not
surprisingly he will then end up arresting primarily black and brown
individuals. He never stops to think about the rate at which he finds
illegal behavior among this group versus the rate he might find it
among a similar number of white drivers and pedestrians. Indeed, it
has never occurred to him that he might find illegal behavior more often among a similar number of whites (as the data consistently show).
. . . His choice of where to look for criminal activity is informed by his
own and society’s biases.280

Importantly, the tenor of this discussion should not be accusatory or critical because, unsurprisingly, police officers will
likely become defensive if they perceive that they are being accused of intentional bigotry.281 Rather, the attitude should be
one of collaboration and teamwork to increase the success rates
of stops and searches.
A final idea for increasing awareness is to have recruits
and officers take the Implicit Association Test (IAT).282 Introduced in 1998, the IAT is the most widely used mechanism for
revealing the existence of implicit attitudes and stereotypes.283
The test has produced consistent results demonstrating that
implicit biases are “pervasive,” unrelated to conscious beliefs,
279. Studies demonstrate that forcing people to take problack attitudes, for
example, backfire. Rudman & Lee, supra note 272, at 857.
280. HARRIS, supra note 105, at 224–25; see also Glaser & Knowles, supra
note 275, at 171 (discussing how an implicit belief that one holds implicit negative racial attitudes can reduce unconscious stereotyping effects).
281. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 105, at 108 (describing an instance of law
enforcement defensiveness).
282. For descriptions of how the IAT works, see Banks, supra note 11, at
1182, Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 954, and Kang & Lane, supra
note 5, at 7–8. Paul Butler has noted that for “high-stakes” decisionmakers
such as judges, some sort of assessment of implicit bias would be valuable.
Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1019, 1042 (2006).
283. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 21, at 952–53. The IAT tests for
both implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes. See, e.g., Blair et al., supra
note 101, at 837. This study also utilizes two other methods for testing implicit
stereotypes. Id. at 829.
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and “predict behavior.”284 The IAT will be easy to administer
because it is available online.285 Officers should be assured that
taking the IAT is solely for educational purposes and that their
results will remain confidential. Importantly, those who developed the IAT oppose its use for selection decisions, including
employment decisions.286
For some officers, learning about hit rates and implicit bias
research, as well as taking the IAT, will persuade them that
implicit attitudes and stereotypes exist. However, there will be
skeptics. Nonetheless, these three ideas for increasing awareness will educate many officers about implicit biases and their
behavioral effects.
2. Training
A 2007 study involving police officers provides intriguing
evidence that extensive training of officers to individuate may
reduce the effects of implicit stereotyping.287 This study tested
experimental shooter-bias situations in which individuals mistakenly shot unarmed blacks and mistakenly failed to shoot
armed whites as a result of implicit social cognitions.288 In this
study, researchers found that officers as well as civilians activated negative black stereotypes upon viewing black individuals.289 As a result, both officers and civilians were quicker to
shoot an unarmed black than an unarmed white.290
However, officers performed much better than civilians did.
Officers were better able to exercise control over their automatic stereotypes and performed much better than civilians when
284. Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 8. By a “conservative estimate
. . . [s]eventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of blacks) show antiblack bias.” Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1072. A 2009 comprehensive
study showed that behavioral effects can be predicted from implicit bias
scores. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test: III, Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2009). This meta-analysis included 122 studies and
14,900 research subjects and demonstrated that IAT scores predicted behaviors in the black-white discrimination context better than explicit reports individual’s did. Id. at 19–20, 32.
285. PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited May
6, 2011).
286. Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 29.
287. Cf. Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68, at 1020–22 (noting that
something in police training procedures may make police less likely to act on
implicit biases than the community at large).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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making decisions whether to shoot. The researchers tentatively
suggested that their training and experience “may allow officers to more effectively exert executive control in the
shoot/don’t-shoot task, essentially overriding response tendencies that stem from racial stereotypes.”291
An earlier shooter bias study involving police officers found
that, after repeated exposure to pairings where race and having
a weapon were unrelated, they exhibited reduced shooter bias
relative to initial trials.292 Other studies similarly demonstrate
that repeatedly pairing race with a nonstereotypical trait resulted in reduced implicit race bias.293 Importantly, then, it appears that training can reduce implicit biases.
Field exercises or simulations where officers are trained to
dissociate race from criminality may capitalize on the effectiveness of training to reduce the behavioral effects of implicit bias.
Of course, it is one thing to suggest such an idea and another to
determine whether it is advisable. Ideas such as this one raise
difficult questions. Is race always irrelevant to assessing criminality? If not, perhaps officers should not be trained to dissociate the two. On the other hand, to the extent that racial stereotypes do not associate whites with criminality, such training

291. Id. at 1021. For a summary of the study, see Jost et al., supra note 5,
at 51. A recent law review article utilizes shooter bias studies to analyze gun
control laws and policies. See Adam Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit
Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1 (2010).
292. Plant & Peruche, supra note 137, at 182. The researchers caution that
“as of yet, there is no evidence that the elimination of bias in response to the
simulation generalizes to other types of responses (e.g., decisions in the field).”
Id. at 183.
293. See, e.g., E. Ashby Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias:
Making Race Non-Diagnostic for Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 154 (2005). Note that in this study, participants were civilians and not officers. Id. at 144. The researchers believed that
if they told the participants to avoid considering race this would have increased bias in that group compared to those who had not been told to avoid
considering race. Id. at 154. The researchers surmised this was a result of subjects learning that race was nondiagnostic, rather than being told that they
should not consider race that made the difference. Id. In another study, showing participants repeated pairs that linked black faces with nonathletic objects
reduced the stereotype of blacks as athletes. B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby
Plant, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Athleticism: The Role of Motivation in the
Elimination of Bias, 24 SOC. COGNITION 438, 448–49 (2006). But see Anthony
J. Bishara & B. Keith Payne, Multinomial Process Tree Models of Control and
Automaticity in Weapon Misidentification, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 524, 531 (2009) (concluding tentatively that controlled processes,
more than automatic processes, control weapon misidentification).
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may simply ensure that nonwhites are treated similarly to
whites.
In another study, researchers found that it was possible to
reduce the effects of implicit biases on behavior by asking individuals to develop a strategy for what they would do or think
when they encounter a stereotyped group member.294 In the
study, researchers asked subjects to “firmly commit” themselves to thinking “safe” each time they saw a black face.295
Remarkably, subjects who committed themselves to this “counterstereotypic . . . intention” reduced the effects of automatic
stereotyping on their ability to accurately differentiate weapons
from innocuous objects.296 This method holds the intriguing
possibility that simply asking police officers to commit themselves to thinking, “If I see a black individual, I will think innocent” or some other appropriate counterstereotypic intent may
reduce the effects of implicit bias on their behavior towards
blacks. For example, officers might commit themselves to
thinking, “If I see a black individual that I believe is acting
suspiciously, I will first consider whether I would have viewed
the same actions as suspicious if the individual was white” before conducting a Terry seizure. This idea builds from Professor
Cynthia Lee’s race-switching jury instruction that would ask
jurors if they would feel the same way about a homicide if the
defendant was white and the victim was black.297 Other techniques that have worked in the lab to reduce the automatic activation of stereotypes include extensive practice denouncing
stereotypes298 or affirming counterstereotypes,299 and the use of
mental imagery.300
294. Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient Means of Thought
Control, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1334, 1342 (2008).
295. Id. at 1336.
296. Id. at 1342–43. It is interesting that participants who simply tried to
avoid bias, but who formed no specific plan for doing so, were unable to reduce
automatic racial bias. See id. at 1344. Furthermore, this method of reducing
implicit stereotypes did not result in the “rebound” effect that subjects showed
in other experiments when they simply were told to avoid using stereotypes.
See id. at 1342–44; see also Bodenhausen et al., supra note 243, at 118.
297. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 224 (2003).
298. Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J.
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 876 (2000). The effect only lasted for twenty-four hours. Id.
299. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 272. Affirming counterstereotypes may
work more effectively than denouncing stereotypes. Id. But see Bertram Gaw-
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Training officers to focus their attention on goals that encourage individuation may reduce implicit bias.301 How this is
accomplished will be important. Asking officers to gather more
evidence of suspicious behavior prior to engaging in a stop and
frisk may actually cause officers to interpret the target’s behavior as more suspicious than he otherwise would because of the
activation of implicit stereotypes.302 Instead, it may be more effective to ask officers in the field to determine whether the actions they observe are consistent with innocence. This formulation will focus attention away from criminality and guilt. In
other words, instead of encouraging the gathering of evidence
to substantiate suspicions of guilt (which will increase bias), it
asks officers to ensure that innocent people are not wrongfully
stopped. Thus, the officer’s point of view when observing people
on the street is to interpret ambiguous behavior as evidence of
innocence or to look for signs of innocence rather than signs of
guilt.
This section has sketched the outlines of some training
strategies that may moderate implicit biases amongst the police. However, we should exercise caution in directly translatWronski et al., When “Just Say No” Is Not Enough: Affirmation Versus Negation Training and the Reduction of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 370, 375 (2008) (finding that affirmation reduced automatic stereotype activation while negation training enhanced activation).
300. See Blair et al., supra note 101. The study dealt with reducing gender
stereotypes and participants were asked “to take a few minutes to imagine
what a strong woman is like, why she is considered strong, what she is capable
of doing, and what kinds of hobbies and activities she enjoys.” Then, they were
asked to write a short paragraph describing their image. Id. at 830. According
to psychologist Nilanjana Dasgupta:
[W]hen people engage in cognitive elaboration exercises that increase
the salience of counterstereotypes or that encourage a different way of
thinking, such directed thinking increases the accessibility of counterstereotypic associations linked to outgroups, which in turn temporarily alleviates implicit bias against outgroups . . . . [E]ven when implicit judgments are made in highly time-pressured situations they
can be debiased if people acquire concrete strategies that allow them
to override and modify their automatic responses. These strategies
function as detailed action plans on how to exert control whereas the
mere instruction to avoid bias is clearly not sufficient and sometimes
even counterproductive.
Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 278. For a description of other techniques, including taking the perspective of others, see Devine & Sharp, supra note 30, at
73–74.
301. See Blair, supra note 29, at 242, 250, 252 (noting and discussing situations where focusing on completing goals reduces implicit bias effects).
302. See supra notes 94 –100 and accompanying text.
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ing lab results to the real world of policing. As noted by Professor Richard Banks, the question of how to translate laboratory
findings into real-life policing is complicated. If, for example,
nonwhites are more likely to have a weapon and to shoot officers, then the decision to train officers to disassociate race from
the likelihood of having a weapon may make officers’ jobs more
dangerous.303 This Article does not seek to answer these difficult policy questions. Rather, it simply highlights the need to
think about reducing the effects of implicit bias on officer behavior and to identify ways of doing so.
Furthermore, a richer base of scientific knowledge addressing ways to alleviate implicit biases in general and within police departments in particular is necessary in order to propose
more concrete solutions for training practices to debias the police.304 In particular, it will be important for social scientists
and police departments to collaborate on future research to discover techniques that will work within the police culture. Police
precincts have already participated in a number of studies,
providing a useful roadmap for planning other successful collaborations.305
3. Hiring
An individual’s cohort, both personally and at the
workplace, may be important in reducing implicit biases. For
instance, one study found that an officer reporting more positive personal contacts with blacks was less likely to have negative beliefs about the criminality and violence of blacks.306 Furthermore, positive personal contacts were the “only significant
predictor” of a reduction in shooter bias.307
This has implications for job interview questions. Perhaps
potential hires should be asked to describe positive personal
303. R. Richard Banks et al., Race, Crime, and Antidiscrimination, in
BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3, 16
(Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).
304. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 279 (calling for more empirical research
into “particular bias reduction strategies [that may] be translated from laboratory paradigms to real-word interventions”).
305. See, e.g., Correll, Thin Blue Line, supra note 68; Correll, Dilemma, supra note 22; Eberhardt et al., supra note 42; Peruche & Plant, supra note 185.
306. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 196; see also Stephen C. Wright et
al., The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and
Prejudice, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 74 (1997) (having crossracial friendships can improve racial attitudes).
307. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 197.
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experiences they have had with nonwhites. Certainly, such
questions are job related to the extent that such contacts may
affect officer assessments of nonwhite suspects. If potential officers have had no experience or no positive experience with
blacks, for example, departments should consider this factor in
hiring. If hired, this officer might require additional training or
perhaps should not be deployed to black neighborhoods.
Additionally, there is evidence that exposure to counterstereotypic group members, especially over the long term, reduces
implicit biases.308 Not only does this provide support for asking
officers about their personal contacts with nonwhites, but it also supports increasing the diversity of police departments. Furthermore, increasing diversity will decrease implicit biases
both by providing more opportunities for officers to work in cooperative relationships with peers of different races and by
changing the social norms and attitudes of departments.309 Similarly, promoting nonwhites to positions of authority may also

308. Dasgupta, supra note 104, at 272 (“[L]ongterm immersion, then, in
counterstereotypic social contexts may reduce the default accessibility of stereotypes or enhance the chronic accessibility of counterstereotypes, thereby decreasing the likelihood of biased automatic judgments and evaluations in the
future.” (citations omitted)); Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 101; Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of
Long-Term Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members
on Implicit Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112, 119–
21 (2008); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The Three Cs of Reducing
Prejudice and Discrimination, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION
239, 249 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (explaining that fostering cooperation versus competition helps to reduce racial bias).
309. See, e.g., Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning
Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994) (finding that social influence strongly affects reactions to racism and noting that opinions of racism may derive from a lack of
interracial experience); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Reducing the Expression
of Racial Prejudice, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 103 (1991) (noting that vocalization
of biased attitudes can affect the behavior of others); Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 269, at 649–52 (finding that peer attitudes can influence racial attitudes and behaviors); see also Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 29, at 47–49
(working together can motivate people to make more accurate, nonstereotyped, judgments); Norman Miller, Personalization and the Promise of Contact
Theory, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 387, 391–92 (2002); Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F.
Pettigrew, Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective
and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1145, 1154 –56 (2005) (finding that contact between racial groups is an
important factor in affecting responses to outgroup members). For a general
discussion of the benefits of diversity in reducing implicit biases, see Bodenhausen et al., supra note 243, at 128–29.
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be important because it may affect patrol officers’ implicit biases.310
4. Incentivizing Positive Interactions
Efforts should be made to involve officers in positive interactions with members of the communities they police. One
study involving police officers demonstrated that those who had
had negative contacts with blacks reported higher levels of
negative expectations of blacks, including about their propensity for violence and criminality, than those who had had positive
experiences.311 Increasing the proportion of positive contacts
between the community and the police—especially amongst
those officers who will be patrolling those neighborhoods—will
be important to minimize the stereotypical connection between
blacks and criminality. Departments should find ways to create
incentives to encourage officers to engage in positive experiences with community members. These community-police interactions should include opportunities for working together in
ways that reduce status differences because this encourages
individuals to make judgments that are less reliant on stereotypes.312
310. See, e.g., P.J. Henry & Curtis D. Hardin, The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Status Bias in the Reduction of Implicit Prejudice in the United States
and Lebanon, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 862, 867 (2006) (finding that contact with lower status outgroup members has a reduced effect in diminishing biases of
higher status ingroup members); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181–82 (2003) (finding that the anticipation of interacting
with a higher status outgroup member reduces bias, but anticipated interactions with lower status outgroup members does not); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of Affiliative Motivation,
89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2005) (noting that those in superior positions are less likely to adjust their perceptions to match those in inferior positions). But see Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who’s in
Charge? Effects of Situational Roles on Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES
493, 506 (2001) (noting that when men interact with women in a superior position their bias increases); Linda Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black
Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, 888 (1999) (receiving criticism from an
outgroup member can increase implicit biases).
311. Peruche & Plant, supra note 185, at 197.
312. See Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 29, at 44 –46; Johnson & Johnson,
supra note 308, at 249 (creating cooperation versus competition helps to reduce racial bias); Lowery et al., supra note 104, at 581–83 (motivating people
to develop relationships with a stereotyped group can reduce stereotype activation); Miller, supra note 309, at 391 (greater observable differences between
individuals may result in greater categorization).
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CONCLUSION
The failure of judges to account for the effects of implicit
bias on police behavior and decisionmaking has resulted in a
Fourth Amendment legal regime that unintentionally strengthens the effects of implicit bias on police behavior. This Article
argues that courts should take the science of implicit social
cognition into account and attempt to construct legal doctrine
in a manner that more effectively protects privacy against arbitrary government intrusion. Considering the science also provides a framework for engaging police departments in efforts to
uncover institutional structures and practices that may hinder
effective policing and for thinking creatively about institutional
solutions.
Consideration of the science of implicit social cognition
does not provide easy answers to complicated Fourth Amendment questions. Nor does consideration of this social science allow courts to avoid making difficult normative judgments.
However, acknowledging the ways in which race can impact policing, even in the absence of conscious bias, will allow courts
and other institutions to ask the right questions and to avoid
unintended consequences.
This Article focused on the unintended and harmful consequences that result from a stop-and-frisk jurisprudence based
upon unstated but behaviorally inaccurate assumptions about
police decisionmaking capabilities. The failure to question
these assumptions and to test them against the empirical social
sciences results in doctrine that undermines the core values of
the Fourth Amendment. This Article urges scholars to study
other criminal procedure doctrines to determine whether the
norms and rights sought to be protected are undermined by inaccurate behavioral assumptions.

